Chicago-Kent Law Review
Volume 74
Issue 3 Symposium on Revised UCC Article 9

Article 16

June 1999

How Successful Was the Revision of UCC Article 9: Reflections of
the Reporters
Steven L. Harris
IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law

Charles W. Mooney Jr.

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Steven L. Harris & Charles W. Mooney Jr., How Successful Was the Revision of UCC Article 9: Reflections
of the Reporters, 74 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 1357 (1999).
Available at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview/vol74/iss3/16

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Chicago-Kent Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons @ IIT
Chicago-Kent College of Law. For more information, please contact jwenger@kentlaw.iit.edu,
ebarney@kentlaw.iit.edu.

HOW SUCCESSFUL WAS THE REVISION OF UCC
ARTICLE 9?:
REFLECTIONS OF THE REPORTERS
STEVEN

L. HARRIS & CHARLES W. MOONEY, JR.*

INTRODUCTION

In our 1993 article, The Article 9 Study Committee Report: Strong
Signals and Hard Choices ("Hard Choices"), we sought to "identify
and explain, by way of examples, some important themes and
patterns that emerge[d] from the [PEB Article 9 Study Committee]
Report."' As another of our goals, we sought "to offer some insight
into the challenges that the Drafting Committee" for the revision of
Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC") Article 9 would face. 2 The
Drafting Committee recently has completed its work. In 1998, the
UCC's sponsors officially promulgated Revised Article 9. Now the
process of introducing Revised Article 9 in the legislatures is in full
swing.3 In this article we assess, again by way of examples, the degree
* The authors are, respectively, Norman & Edna Freehling Scholar and Professor of
Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law, and Interim Dean and Professor of Law, University of
Pennsylvania Law School. They served as Reporters for the Drafting Committee to Revised
Uniform Commercial Code Article 9 ("Drafting Committee"). The views expressed in this
article are not necessarily those of the Drafting Committee or its sponsors, the American Law
Institute ("ALl") and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
("NCCUSL").
As used in this article, "Revised Article 9" and "the revised Article" refer to the 1999
official text of Article 9. References to "Revised section 9-XXX" and "R. § 9-XXX" are to
sections of Revised Article 9. "The Former Article" refers to the 1995 official text of Article 9.
References to "Former section 9-XXX" and "U.C.C. § 9-XXX" are to sections of the Former
Article.
1. Steven L. Harris & Charles W. Mooney, Jr., The Article 9 Study Committee Report:
Strong Signals and Hard Choices, 29 IDAHO L. REV. 561, 562 (1993). The article addressed
primarily the recommendations made in the report of the UCC Permanent Editorial Board's
Article 9 Study Committee, for which we served as reporters. See PEB STUDY GROUP,
PERMANENT EDITORIAL BD. FOR THE UNIF. COMMERCIAL CODE, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE ARTICLE 9 REPORT (Dec. 1, 1992) [hereinafter REPORT]. For background on the work of
the Study Committee, including its organization and methodology, see id. at 1-16. The
Committee's chair and reporters also issued an interim report. See William M. Burke et al.,
Interim Report on the Activities of the Article 9 Study Committee, 46 Bus. LAW. 1883 (1991).
2. See Harris & Mooney, supra note 1, at 562.
3. For background on the drafting process, which began in 1993 and ended in early 1999
with the final touches on Revised Article 9 and its official comments, see R. § 9-101 cmt. 2.
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of success with which the Drafting Committee met the challenges that
Hard Choices identified. Our assessment necessarily is preliminary.
The process of legislative enactment and the experience of
transacting business and litigating under the revised Article
undoubtedly will lead us to refine, and perhaps revise, our views.
We hasten to note at the outset that although we made known
our thoughts on particular issues during the drafting process, we were
not voting members of the Drafting Committee. On the other hand,
we do not seek to escape our share of the responsibility should
positions that we advanced turn out to be unwise, and we promise to
be appropriately contrite should those against which we argued prove
successful. Moreover, we must acknowledge responsibility for defects
in drafting or organization, inasmuch as we bore considerable
responsibility for those aspects of Revised Article 9. "Style" questions
4
are quite another matter indeed.
This article is organized generally along the lines of Hard
Choices. Part I addresses Revised Article 9 in the context of
bankruptcy policy, with a particular focus on the relationship between
secured credit (and creditors) and unsecured credit (and creditors).
Part II considers Revised Article 9's modification -generally an
expansion-of the scope of Article 9's coverage. Part III explores
how Revised Article 9 addresses three areas that have a substantial
impact on secured financing but which cannot be addressed fully by
the text of Article 9: filing systems, statutory liens on Article 9
collateral, and federal preemption of many aspects of intellectual
property law. Part IV assesses various approaches to codification
reflected by Revised Article 9, including the degree of balance
between complexity and simplicity and between the promulgation of
finely-crafted, detailed rules designed to give a definitive answer to a
variety of questions and the establishment of "rough" principles
intended to provide only general guidance to parties and the courts.
I. STRIKING THE APPROPRIATE BALANCE BETWEEN UNSECURED
AND SECURED CREDITORS

In Hard Choices we observed that "[t]he appropriate relationship

4. Under NCCUSL's procedures, all drafts are reviewed by the Committee on Style,
which "revises as to phraseology and style, but without altering the meaning or context, all Acts
submitted to it by Drafting Committees and all Acts approved by the Conference." NATIONAL
CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS, PROCEDURAL AND DRAFTING MANUAL 4

(1997).
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between secured and unsecured creditors may present the single most
important cluster of issues that the Drafting Committee will
address."5 Reflecting on the process and its results, we believe that
our observation has proved to be accurate. The potential effect of

Article 9 revisions on the interests of unsecured creditors, including in
a debtor's bankruptcy, was the subject of discussion throughout the

drafting process. The Drafting Committee received assistance on
specific bankruptcy-related issues from a special task force on

bankruptcy issues.6 Consistent with the underlying approach and recommendations of the Report, Revised Article 9 embraces the goal of
facilitating the extension of secured credit. The revised Article rejects
the assumption, prevailing in some circles, that secured credit
somehow primarily benefits secured creditors and is necessarily
detrimental to unsecured creditors.7 Instead, it reflects the increasing

awareness that the principal beneficiaries of secured credit are the
borrowers to whom credit is extended and others who have
commercial or other relationships with those borrowers.8 Assets
claimed by secured creditors in an insolvency proceeding are not, of
course, available for distribution to unsecured creditors. Indeed, the
essence of a secured transaction is the resulting priority of a security
interest over subsequent judicial lien creditors and the debtor's
5. Harris & Mooney, supra note 1, at 569.
6. The task force, comprised largely of bankruptcy specialists, devoted particular
attention to proposals by academics for restricting the effectiveness of security interests. See,
e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for the Priorityof Secured Claims
in Bankruptcy, 105 YALE L.J. 857, 913-29 (1996). Having received hardly any support among
members of the task force and no support whatsoever from anyone who ever attended a
meeting of the Drafting Committee, these proposals were rejected. The proposals were
advocated also before the Council of the ALl and at a NCCUSL Annual Meeting, where they
met with almost unanimous disapproval.
7. For a fuller description of this view, see Steven L. Harris & Charles W. Mooney, Jr., A
Property-Based Theory of Security Interests: Taking Debtors' Choices Seriously, 80 VA. L. REV.
2021, 2045-47 (1994).
8. See, e.g., Heywood W. Fleisig et al., Legal Restrictions on Security Interests Limit Access
to Credit in Bolivia, 31 INT'L LAW. 65, 66, 70-72, 98 (1997); Heywood W. Fleisig & Nuria de ]a
Pefia, Peru: How Problems in the Frameworkfor Secured Transactions Limit Access to Credit,
NAFTA: LAW & Bus. REV. AM., Spring 1997, at 33, 34-46; Steven L. Harris & Charles W.
Mooney, Jr., Measuring the Social Costs and Benefits and Identifying the Victims of
Subordinating Security Interests in Bankruptcy, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 1349, 1356-61 (1997);
Harris & Mooney, supra note 7, at 2028-37; Anthony Saunders et al., The Economic
Implications of International Secured Transactions Law Reform: A Case Study, 20 U. PA. J.
INT'L ECON. L. 309 (1999); Steven L. Schwarcz, The Easy Case for the Priority of Secured
Claims in Bankruptcy, 47 DUKE L.J. 425 (1997). We use the term "borrowers" to include sellers
of rights to payment in transactions governed by Article 9, see U.C.C. § 9-102(1)(b) (Former
Article 9 applies to sales of accounts and chattel paper); R. § 9-109(a)(3) (Revised Article 9
applies to sales of accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, and promissory notes), and
"secured parties" or "secured creditors" to include buyers of these receivables, see U.C.C.
§ 9-105(1)(m) (defining "secured party"); R. § 9-102(a)(72) (same).
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trustee in bankruptcy. 9 But that says nothing about the benefits that

are conferred on borrowers and unsecured creditors generally by
facilitating secured credit.1°
The following discussion does not dwell on these more general
benefits of secured credit. Instead, the discussion addresses primarily
the extent to which Revised Article 9's enhanced facilitation of
secured credit may be expected to provide materially greater

recoveries for secured creditors in bankruptcy. Will these
distributional effects of Revised Article 9 (i.e., enhanced recoveries
for secured creditors) result in a substantial shift in the balance in
favor of secured creditors? In general, our answer is an emphatic
"no." Indeed, in many cases Revised Article 9 stops short of the rec-

ommendations made in the Report, and in several respects it places
burdens on secured creditors that are greater than those under

Article

9.12

As we mentioned, Revised Article 9 generally facilitates the

extension of secured credit, including transactions in which rights to
payment (receivables) are sold outright. Many of its provisions make
it easier and less expensive to create and perfect security interests and

to achieve priority over competing claimants. Some specific examples
may be useful.
Following a recommendation made in the Report,13 Revised

Article 9 provides that a security interest in instruments, both
9. As we observed in Hard Choices:
Making perfection easier and less costly to accomplish is likely to tilt the balance
between secured and unsecured creditors: the number of unperfected security interests
in bankruptcy can be expected to decline and the allocation of a debtor's property is
likely to become more favorable to secured parties.
Harris & Mooney, supra note 1, at 565.
10. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
11. Compare, e.g., Recommendation 7.C., REPORT, supra note 1, at 68-70 (recommending
that the Drafting Committee give serious attention to the subcommittee report's recommendations, including perfection of security interests in deposit accounts as original collateral by filing)
with R. § 9-312(b)(1) (security interest in a deposit account as original collateral may be
perfected only by control).
12. Compare, e.g., R. § 9-313(c) (perfection by possession when collateral is in the
possession of a person other than the debtor requires an acknowledgment by the other person
that it holds the collateral for the secured party's benefit); and id. § 9-611(c) (secured party is
required to give notification of disposition of collateral to secured parties or lienholders that
have filed financing statements against the debtor covering the collateral) with U.C.C. § 9-305
(perfection by possession when collateral is in the possession of a bailee requires notification to,
but not acknowledgment by, the bailee); and id. § 9-504(3) (secured party is required to give
notification of disposition of collateral to a competing secured party only if the secured party
has received written notification of the competing secured party's claim).
13. See REPORT, supra note 1, at 152-54. We discuss this recommendation in Hard Choices.
See Harris & Mooney, supra note 1, at 565-66.
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negotiable and nonnegotiable, may be perfected either by filing or by
taking possession. 14 Under the Former Article, only possession of an

instrument would suffice for perfection. 5 Perfection by filing against
instruments will provide substantial cost savings in many transactional
1 6

settings.

The revised Article also clarifies what constitutes an adequate
description of collateral in a security agreement, which is a necessary

condition for attachment of most nonpossessory security interests.
Similarly, it clarifies the requirements of an adequate identification of
collateral in a financing statement. A financing statement that
describes the collateral or indicates that it covers all assets or all
personal property is sufficient.18
Revised Article 9 also facilitates secured credit by expanding its
reach beyond that of the Former Article. This observation assumes,
reasonably, that extending credit or buying receivables under Revised
Article 9's coherent and rational system offers advantages over

operating under common-law or other statutory rules that may be
hard to find and, once found, unclear. Revised Article 9's coverage of

security interests in deposit accounts as original collateral,
commercial tort claims, and sales of many rights to payment not
covered by Article 9 illustrates this expanded scope. 9
Revised Article 9's treatment of proceeds of collateral provides
another example of its facilitation of secured credit. The definition of
"proceeds" has been expanded to cover property acquired by a

debtor that is a functional substitute for original collateral; Former
Article 9 covered only receipts from dispositions and collections and
14. See R. §§ 9-312(a), 9-313(a).
15. See U.C.C. § 9-304(1). But see id. §§ 9-304(4)-(5), 9-306(3) (providing for temporary
perfection of a security interest in instruments in specified circumstances). Cf. R. §§ 9-312(e),
(g), 9-315(d) (preserving these rules in revised form).
16. As explained in Hard Choices, a perfection-by-filing rule makes it unnecessary to
determine whether a particular writing is an instrument or to make alternative assumptions,
necessitating both filing and taking possession. See Harris & Mooney, supra note 1, at 565-66.
Perfection by filing against instruments also avoids the costs and impracticalities of taking
possession when the collateral consists of large numbers of instruments. See id. at 566; R. § 9-312
cmt. 2.
17. See R. §§ 9-108, 9-203(b)(3)(A).
18. See id. § 9-504.
19. Revised Article 9 covers sales of payment intangibles and promissory notes. See id.
§ 9-109(a)(3); see also id. § 9-102(a)(61) (defining "payment intangible"), (65) (defining
"promissory note"). As did Former Article 9, Revised Article 9 applies to sales of accounts and
chattel paper. See R. § 9-109(a)(3); U.C.C. § 9-102(1)(b). The definition of "account" also has
been expanded to include most rights to payment that would be general intangibles under
Article 9, sales of which were not covered by that article. See U.C.C. § 9-102(a). The expanded
scope of Revised Article 9 is addressed in more detail below in Part II.
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certain insurance proceeds. 20 The revised Article also provides that if
a security interest in original collateral is perfected by any means, a
security interest in identifiable cash proceeds of the collateral is
perfected indefinitely. 21 Under Former Article 9, a security interest in
cash proceeds continued to be perfected beyond ten days only if the
security interest in the original collateral had been perfected by
filing. 22 In addition, Revised Article 9 contains special priority rules
that preserve for proceeds the priority in original collateral afforded
by various nontemporal priority rules (some new, some derived from
the Former Article).23
Revised Article 9 reflects substantial improvements in two other
important respects-filing and enforcement. 24 As was the case under
the Former Article, the filing system is the heart of Revised Article 9.
The new filing rules, found in Part 5 of the revised Article, clarify
various questions left unanswered by Former Article 9, resolve issues
left in doubt or in conflict under the Former Article by the courts, and
impose specific requirements on filing offices to increase efficiency,
accuracy, and speed. The new filing system also is a "mediumneutral" regime that permits filing offices to adopt nonpaper,
electronic means of filing and searching. Similarly, the enforcement
provisions found in Part 6 of the revised Article draw on
experience-good, bad, and indifferent-under Former Article 9 in
fashioning solutions to various problems that arose under the Former
Article. New Part 6 also adds needed flexibility. Although the revised
enforcement provisions may be expected to be used in only a small
minority of transactions, 21 we anticipate that the increased comfort
provided ex ante, as in the other examples mentioned above, will help
make more credit available at a lower cost. Revised Article 9's
approach to contractual and legal restrictions or prohibitions of
20. Compare R. § 9-102(a)(64) with U.C.C. § 9-306(1).
21. See R. § 9-315(c), (d)(2).
22. See U.C.C. § 9-306(3)(b).
23. See R. § 9-322(c)-(e). We discuss these rules below in Part IV.A.2.
24. For an overview and discussion of the highlights of filing and enforcement under
Revised Article 9, see Steven L. Harris & Charles W. Mooney, Jr., Filing and Enforcement
Under Revised Article 9, 54 Bus. LAW. 1965 (1999). For more detailed discussions, see Harry C.
Sigman, Twenty Questions About Filing Under Revised Article 9: The Rules of the Game Under
New Part 5,74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 861 (1999); and Donald J. Rapson, Default and Enforcement
of Security Interests Under Revised Article 9, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 893 (1999). We discuss the
relationship between the statutory text of Revised Article 9 and the extra-textual characteristics
of filing systems below in Part III.
25. See Ronald J.Mann, Strategy and Force in the Liquidation of Secured Debt, 96 MICH. L.
REV. 159, 227 (1997) ("[N]ot a single one of my forty-four personal-property [commercial loan]
profiles involved a repossession and sale of collateral.").
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assignments of intangibles provides a final example of its facilitation
of secured credit. The revised Article overrides virtually all
contractual and legal restrictions to the creation, attachment, and
perfection of security interests in intangibles;26 however, it recognizes

and protects the interests of other parties to intangibles by insuring
that these interests cannot be compromised by the enforcement of a
security interest.27 Although these new overrides may be expected to
allow increased recoveries from collateral in bankruptcy, we expect
the effects outside of bankruptcy-the facilitation of additional
extensions of credit-will be more pronounced. 28
These examples and many other provisions of Revised Article 9
reflect the Drafting Committee's effort to achieve more than merely
"better," more "efficient," "equitable," or "reasonable" rules to
govern secured transactions. An overarching goal of the revisions was

to provide in the transactional context enhanced certainty and
predictability from the inception of transactions. This certainty can
facilitate transactions even though an understandable rule with
predictable consequences may be normatively suboptimal.
One might conclude from the foregoing that the Drafting
Committee pulled no punches in making security interests as easy to
conclude, perfect, and enforce, and as impervious to the claims of
third parties, as humanly possible. But that conclusion would be far

off the mark. To the contrary, the Drafting Committee sought
26. See R. §§ 9-406 to 9-408.
27. Consider, for example, a license of intellectual property that prohibits the licensee from
assigning the right to use the intellectual property. Revised section 9-408(a) renders this
restriction ineffective to the extent it impairs the creation, attachment, or perfection of a
security interest in the licensee's rights (a general intangible). Thus, the licensee may create an
enforceable, perfected security interest in its rights under the license. However, Revised section
9-408(d) provides that, if the restriction on assignment would be effective under other law, the
security interest is not enforceable against, and imposes no duty on, the account debtor (here,
the licensor). A similar result would obtain if the restriction on assignment arose under other
law. Of course, Revised Article 9 does not override conflicting federal law. See U.S. CONST. art.
VI (Supremacy Clause).
28. As the Official Comments explain:
The principal effects of this section [R. § 9-408] will take place outside of bankruptcy.
Compared to the relatively few debtors that enter bankruptcy, there are many more
that do not. By making available previously unavailable property as collateral, this
section should enable debtors to obtain additional credit. For purposes of determining
whether to extend credit, under some circumstances a secured party may ascribe value
to the collateral to which its security interest has attached, even if this section
precludes the secured party from enforcing the security interest without the agreement
of the account debtor or person obligated on the promissory note. This may be the case
where the secured party sees a likelihood of obtaining that agreement in the future.
This may also be the case where the secured party anticipates that the collateral will
give rise to a type of proceeds as to which this section would not apply.
R. § 9-408 cmt. 8.
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balance at every turn. If an efficient system of secured transactions is
a good thing, it does not follow that pushing this generally beneficial

regime to the extreme in every context must be even better. Indeed,
the filing system itself may properly be viewed as an impediment to

creating a perfected security interest. Article 9 extracts from the
parties the price of public notice in exchange for the transactional
benefits that it provides.
Examples abound of the revised Article's balance and the
Drafting Committee's restraint; we mention only a few here. First,
although the thrust of Revised Article 9 is the facilitation of secured

credit, the revision process saw little interest in making changes that
would materially disrupt the status quo concerning the avoidance of

unperfected security interests in bankruptcy. 29 For example, a
proposal to confer on an unperfected security interest priority over a
judicial lien ° gathered virtually no support among members of the
31
Drafting Committee or the many advisors and observers.

One of the most controversial aspects of the Report-at least if
controversy is measured by the apparent level of dyspepsia that it
generated during the drafting process-was the recommendation that
Article 9 embrace deposit accounts as original collateral. 32 From the

outset, it was clear that a substantial minority of the Drafting
29. One might quibble with the statement in the text. Revised Article 9 facilitates secured
credit in part by enhancing certainty, including by making the requirements for perfection more
certain. These requirements may result in fewer security interests that are inadvertently
unperfected when the debtor enters bankruptcy. We do not believe that the consequent
reduction in the number of unperfected security interests avoided in bankruptcy can be
characterized fairly as a disruption of bankruptcy avoidance powers.
30. See James J. White, Revising Article 9 to Reduce Wasteful Litigation, 26 LOY. L.A. L.
REv. 823, 823-26 (1993).
31. The absence of support may have reflected views on the merits, concerns about adverse
political reactions that might jeopardize enactment, distributional bias, or some combination of
these (or other) reasons. However, the absence of support most certainly did not result from the
mistaken notion that adopting the proposal would, somehow, contradict principles embodied in
the Bankruptcy Code or be outside the proper domain of Article 9. It could hardly be clearer
that whether the bankruptcy trustee may exercise the power to avoid any given transfer under
Bankruptcy Code section 544(a) depends exclusively on nonbankruptcy law. See 11 U.S.C.
§ 544(a) (1994). For personal property and fixtures, nonbankruptcy law normally is UCC
Article 9.
32. Benefiting from two reports on the subject from an advisory group and drawing upon
the experience of deposit account financing in three states, the Study Committee recommended
that the Drafting Committee revise Article 9 to include deposit accounts as original collateral,
see Recommendation 7.A., REPORT, supra note 1, at 68, and that the Drafting Committee
seriously consider adopting the specific perfection, priority, choice-of-law, enforcement, and
other rules recommended by the advisory group. See Recommendation 7.C., id., at 68. When the
Report was issued in December 1992, deposit accounts could serve as original collateral under
Article 9 as enacted in four states-California, Hawaii, Illinois, and Louisiana. See id. at 68 n.2.
However, Illinois had been in the group for less than a year. The group now includes Idaho as
well.
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Committee, including some members associated with the secured
financing industry, had reservations about including deposit accounts
as original collateral. The Drafting Committee disagreed over
whether lenders actually would extend additional credit in reliance on
a deposit account to which the debtor had access; it disagreed over
whether obtaining a perfected security interest in all deposit accounts
of a debtor would become the routine result in the vast run of secured
transactions; it disagreed over the appropriate priority rule for
resolving a conflict between a security interest in a deposit account as
original collateral and a security interest in the deposit account
claimed as proceeds of inventory, accounts, or other original
collateral; it disagreed over the appropriate priority rule for resolving
a conflict between a security interest in a deposit account and the
bank's right of setoff; and it disagreed over whether the benefits of
including deposit accounts as original collateral justified the many
special provisions required to accomplish the task. The Federal
Reserve Bank of New York expressed concern that security interests
in deposit accounts would impede the free flow of funds through the
payment system. Consumer-advocacy groups feared that individuals
would inadvertently or unwisely encumber their bank accounts.
Ultimately, the Drafting Committee settled on an approach that
appears to have satisfied (grudgingly, perhaps) all concerned. The
basic principles of the approach are straightforward.3 3 First, Revised
Article 9 deals directly with the concerns of the New York Fed by
providing that transferees of funds from a deposit account take free
of a security interest in the deposit account, even if they actually
know of the security interest and even if they give no value. 34 The
only exception is for a transferee who acts in collusion with the debtor
in violating the rights of the secured party.35 Other than encountering
some difficulties articulating the appropriate standard for the
exception, the Drafting Committee had little difficulty settling on this
rule.
The Drafting Committee had greater difficulty deciding what to
do about consumer deposit accounts. Representatives of banks that
extend consumer credit argued for including them as original
33. This approach is discussed somewhat more fully below in Part II.E. For a more
complete and detailed discussion of the issues raised by including deposit accounts as original
collateral under Revised Article 9, see Bruce A. Markell, From Property to Contractand Back:
An Examination of Deposit Accounts and Revised Article 9, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 963 (1999).
34. See R. § 9-332(b).
35. See id.

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74:1357

collateral. They claimed that the applicable common-law
requirements for an effective "pledge" of a deposit account were
uncertain and, to the extent certain, costly to implement.
Representatives of consumer-advocacy groups did not dispute this
claim. Rather, they objected to eliminating the uncertainty and cost,
lest the use of deposit accounts as original collateral become more
widespread. Perhaps because they made a political judgment that
opposition to the proposed inclusion of deposit accounts in consumer
transactions might have resulted in excluding deposit accounts as
original collateral in commercial transactions as well, the Drafting
Committee agreed to exclude from Revised Article 9 assignments of
36
deposit accounts in consumer transactions.
The third basic principle is that a security interest in a deposit
account as original collateral may be perfected only by "control"; it
may not be perfected by filing a financing statement.3 7 "Control" of a
deposit account is defined in much the same way as "control" of a
security entitlement.3 8 A secured party having control of a deposit
account normally has the power (even if not always the right) to
appropriate the funds on deposit. In the minds of some, control
served as a proxy for the secured party's having relied on the deposit
account as collateral when deciding whether and to what extent to
extend credit to the debtor. Perhaps more accurately, lack of control
served as a proxy for lack of reliance. A secured party that does not
even take the steps necessary to enable itself to reach the funds on
the debtor's default is unlikely to rely on the deposit account as
original collateral in any meaningful way. Its unperfected security
interest is junior to the rights of the debtor's judicial lien creditors and
trustee in bankruptcy. Revised Article 9's control-only perfection rule
is in part a response to those who argued that it should not be "too
easy" to take a deposit account as original collateral. The rule actually
makes it more difficult to perfect a security interest in a deposit
account as original collateral than under the nonuniform versions of

36. See id. § 9-109(d)(13).
37. See id. §§ 9-312(b)(1), 9-314(a). A security interest in a deposit account that is proceeds
of most other types of other collateral may be perfected by filing. See id. § 9-315(c), (d)(2).
38. Compare id. § 9-104(a) with U.C.C. § 8-106(d). A secured party has control of a deposit
account if the secured party is the bank with which the deposit account is maintained; if the
debtor, secured party, and bank with which the deposit account is maintained agree in an
authenticated record that the bank will comply with instructions originated by the secured party
directing disposition of the funds in the account without further consent by the debtor; or if the
secured party becomes the bank's customer with respect to the account. See R. § 9-104(a).
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Article 9 currently in force in some jurisdictions.3 9
Modification of the method of perfecting a security interest
through the possession of collateral by a person other than the debtor
or secured party is another example of the measured approach taken
in Revised Article 9. Under Former Article 9, perfection by
possession could be achieved by the bailee's receipt of notification of
the security interest. 40 In a change analogous to the control-only

perfection rule for deposit accounts, perfection in this setting under
Revised Article 9 occurs only if a person other than the debtor or
secured party "authenticates a record acknowledging that it holds [or
will hold] possession of the collateral for the secured party's

benefit."

41

No one can prove or even predict with confidence whether and

the extent to which unsecured creditors generally will fare better or
worse under Revised Article 9.42 Is the end result "perfect" in every
respect? Of course not. But the Drafting Committee and, ultimately,
the UCC's sponsors used their best efforts to modernize, improve,
and refine the law of secured transactions with a view toward

facilitating extensions of credit. The project was undertaken with care
and patience. It was characterized by robust debate and the frank
exchange of differing views. There was nothing particularly novel or
odd about the exercise, except that the Drafting Committee received
greater and more widespread input than in any earlier uniform law

project that we know about. 43

39. For example, California law provides that perfection is achieved merely by giving
written notice of the security interest to the bank at which the deposit account is maintained.
See CAL. COM. CODE § 9302(1)(g)(ii) (West 1990 & Supp. 1999).
40. See U.C.C. § 9-305. This approach left several questions unanswered and disputed,
including whether the secured party, as opposed to the debtor, could give an effective
notification and whether a bailee's receipt of notification imposed upon the bailee any duties.
41. R. § 9-313(c)(1).
42. See Harris & Mooney, supra note 8, at 1356-64.
43. Fortunately, very few of the many who followed the revision process appear to have
been swayed by hyperbole painting it as a classic David and Goliath battle of good against evil.
See, e.g., Kenneth N. Klee, Barbariansat the Trough: Riposte in Defense of the Warren CarveOut Proposal,82 CORNELL L. REV. 1466, 1468 (1997) (characterizing the revision process as a
"secured creditors' grab" that reflects "hysterical efforts to entrench wealth in the hands of
banks, insurance companies, and finance companies at the expense of tort creditors, tax
creditors, environmental creditors, and, perhaps, employees and trade creditors"); see also
Elizabeth Warren, Making Policy with Imperfect Information: The Article 9 Full Priority
Debates, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 1373, 1374 (1997) (describing reform effort as a "headlong push
to enlarge on every scintilla of priority for secured creditors").
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II. SCOPE OF ARTICLE 9

Including deposit accounts as original collateral is not the only

way in which the revision enlarges the scope of Article 9. That scope
already was very broad. The Former Article applied generally to "any

transaction (regardless of its form) which is intended to create a
security interest in personal property or fixtures," 44 and to "security
interests created by contract. ' 45 Although Former section 9-104
excluded thirteen types of transactions, several of the exclusions

followed directly from the limitations inherent in the scope
provisions. 46
Article 9 is a product of the 1950s, when personal property
financing was concerned largely with goods and rights arising from
transactions in goods, such as accounts (rights to payment for goods
sold) and documents of title. Other types of intangible property have
become important sources of wealth in the ensuing decades. Not
surprisingly, many of the Report's recommendations to expand the
Article's scope dealt with rights to payment (sales of general
intangibles for money due, deposit accounts, rights under insurance
policies, tort claims) and other intangible collateral (intellectual
property).47 The transactions that the recommendations would bring
within the ambit of Revised Article 9 generally are possible under the

common law. 48 However, Article 9 provides a legal framework that
the Study Committee thought likely to reduce the costs and

uncertainty attendant to common-law transactions.
In this part we examine the extent to which the revised Article
follows the Study Committee's recommendations concerning scope
44. U.C.C. § 9-102(1)(a).
45. Id. § 9-102(2).
46. See, e.g., id. § 9-104(c) (generally excluding liens given by statute or other rule of law
for services and materials), (j) (generally excluding the creation or transfer of an interest in or
lien on real estate).
47. Despite the breadth of Article 9's coverage, Part III.A of the Report addressed seven
scope-related topics. See REPORT, supra note 1, at 43-49 (sales of general intangibles and credit
card receivables), 50-55 (intellectual property), 56-57 (rights under insurance policies), 58-59
(tort claims), 60-66 (fixtures and real estate-related collateral), 67 (oil, gas, and minerals-related
collateral), 68-71 (deposit accounts). Other portions of the Report dealt with several other areas
that raised issues of Article 9's scope. See id. at 91-93 (non-UCC principles of law and equity),
106-34 (proceeds), 178-80 (nonassignable contracts, permits, and licenses), 181-84 (agricultural
financing), 194-98 (financing buyers and nonlease bailments).
48. Although the common law permits the creation of a security interest in a deposit
account, the common-law requirements may serve as a practical impediment to taking a security
interest in a deposit account used for day-to-day operations. See, e.g., Dwight L. Greene,
Deposit Accounts as Bank Loan Collateral Beyond Setoff to Perfection- The Common Law Is
Alive and Well, 39 DRAKE L. REV. 259 (1990).
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and explain briefly how the Drafting Committee reached the results it
did.
A. Sale of GeneralIntangibles
The Drafting Committee expended much time and energy
considering issues related to sales of rights to payment. 49 Unlike the
decision whether to include deposit accounts as original collateral,
which was contentious, there was general agreement from the outset
on the goals to be accomplished with respect to sales of receivables.
The problems were primarily ones of implementation.
Former Article 9 applied to sales of certain types of payment
streams -accounts and chattel paper. Sales of other rights to
payment--general intangibles and promissory notes-continued to be
governed by non-Article 9 law. Not very long after Article 9 became
widely enacted, Homer Kripke observed that the exclusion of nonsales- and non-service-related rights to payment from the definition
of "account" was an anomaly and did not reflect the intent of the
drafters. 0 The reason for including outright sales of payment streams
in a law governing secured transactions applies equally to virtually all
rights to payment, regardless of the nature of the transaction under
which the right arises. 51 Accordingly, the Study Committee
recommended that Revised Article 9 include sales of general
intangibles for money due.52 In Hard Choices we observed that the
Drafting Committee would face two challenges in giving effect to this
recommendation. First, it would need to distinguish general
intangibles for money due from other general intangibles (e.g., the
franchisee's rights under a franchise). Sales of the latter typically are
not financing transactions and, therefore, not properly within the
scope of Article 9. Second, the Drafting Committee would need to
exclude sales of loan participations, including loan participations in
chattel paper, from the scope of the revised Article. 3
49. Sales of rights to payment are an important component of securitization transactions.
For a discussion of the revised Article's likely effects on securitization, see Steven L. Schwarcz,
The Impact on Securitization of Revised UCCArticle 9, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 947 (1999).
50. See Homer Kripke, Suggestions for Clarifying Article 9: Intangibles, Proceeds, and
Priorities,41 N.Y.U. L. REV. 687, 690-93 (1966).
51. As the Official Comment to Former section 9-102 explained, "Commercial financing on
the basis of accounts and chattel paper is often so conducted that the distinction between a
security transfer and a sale is blurred, and a sale of such property is therefore covered by
[Article 9.]" U.C.C. § 9-102 cmt. 2.
52. See Recommendation L.A., REPORT, supra note 1, at 43.
53. See Harris & Mooney, supra note 1, at 571-72.
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The Drafting Committee made the first decision, to apply
Revised Article 9 to sales of general intangibles for money due, early
and easily. From the earliest drafts, the Drafting Committee was
content to define these general intangibles by reference to the
account debtor's "principal obligation. 5 4 The Drafting Committee
apparently recognized the futility of striving for greater precision and
made virtually no effort over the following years to distinguish what
have come to be known as "payment intangibles," whose sale is
subject to Revised Article 9, from other general intangibles, whose
sale is not governed by the revised Article. Thus, Revised Article 9
defines "payment intangible" as "a general intangible under which
the account debtor's principal obligation is a monetary obligation." 55
As an Official Comment observes:
Virtually any intangible right could give rise to a right to payment
of money once one hypothesizes, for example, that the account
debtor is in breach of its obligation. The term "payment
intangible," however, embraces only those general intangibles
"under which the account debtor's principal obligation is a
'56
monetary obligation.
Undoubtedly, at some time, property will be sold as to which the
nature of the account debtor's principal obligation (monetary or
otherwise) is uncertain. In determining whether the collateral is a
payment intangible, courts should consider the purpose for including
sales of payment intangibles within Revised Article 9 and the
consequences of doing so."
Most of the Drafting Committee's time and energy on the issue
of sales of general intangibles was spent confronting the second
challenge, finding a way to exclude sales of loan participations from
the scope of the Revised Article.5 8 The Drafting Committee's efforts
54. The Drafting Committee decided to include within the scope of Revised Article 9 most
sales of general intangibles for money due at its very first meeting. The first full draft to reflect
this decision defined "general intangible for money due or to become due" to mean "a general
intangible under which the account debtor's principal obligation is to pay money." U.C.C.
§ 9-106 (NCCUSL Annual Meeting Draft 1995).
55. R. § 9-102(a)(61). This section differs from the analogous 1995 provision cited in the
preceding note in only two, relatively insignificant ways. First, the defined term has been
changed to "payment intangible" from "general intangible for money due or to become due."
Second, the definition eliminated the use of the defined term "money." Compare id. with U.C.C.
§ 9-106 (NCCUSL Annual Meeting Draft 1995). "'Money' means a medium of exchange
authorized or adopted by a domestic or foreign government." U.C.C. § 1-201(24).
56. R. § 9-102 cmt. 5d (quoting id. § 9-102(a)(61) (emphasis added)).
57. See U.C.C. § 1-102(1) (UCC "shall be liberally construed and applied to promote its
underlying purposes and policies"), (2) (explaining underlying purposes and policies of UCC).
58. The Study Committee appreciated that Article 9 may be construed as covering some
sales of participations in loans that are evidenced by chattel paper. It recommended that Article

1999]

REFLECTIONS OF THE REPORTERS

to meet that challenge were complicated by the conflicting goals of
financial institutions. Bringing payment intangibles into Article 9
proved to be popular with those departments of a financial institution
which handle securitization and other financing transactions such as
sales of credit card receivables. It would enable these transactions to
proceed with greater certainty, less risk, and less cost. On the other
hand, those who staffed loan participation desks feared that bringing
sales of loan participations into Revised Article 9 would wreak havoc
and adamantly opposed revising Article 9 along those lines.
With the assistance of the American Bar Association Task Force
on Securitized Asset Financing, the Drafting Committee considered
and rejected several statutory approaches to this problem. Ultimately
people realized that the concern of the loan participation markets was
less with the abstract question of inclusion or exclusion from Revised
Article 9 than with the practical impediments that might arise from
conditioning perfection on the filing of a financing statement 9 The
Drafting Committee's elegant solution to this problem was to provide
that sales of loan participations be perfected automatically upon
attachment. ° To accomplish this result, the Drafting Committee still
needed to distinguish sales of loan participations, which were
perfected automatically, from sales of other rights to payment, which

9 be revised to provide that "loan participations and other loan sales by financial institutions
(and, possibly, sales by other classes of professional lenders) do not constitute the sale of chattel
paper that is within the scope of Article 9." Recommendation 21.C., REPORT, supra note 1, at
169. Perhaps because of its inability to distinguish between loan participations and other sales of
rights to payment, the Drafting Committee took no action on this recommendation.
59. The Report suggests that Article 9's "filing requirements would be obstructive in the
high volume, high velocity loan-participation market." Id. at 47. There is some question,
however, as to the extent to which a participant in the loan-participation market would have
reason to care about whether its interest is perfected. Perfection comes into play only as against
competing creditors (or a receiver) of the seller or as against another buyer of the same
participation interest. The first reflects the risk that the assignor will become insolvent.
Assignees of loan participations take at least some of this risk today with respect to the
creditworthiness of their assignors. Because Article 9 does not apply to the sale of loan
participations, see U.C.C. § 9-102(1)-(2), the common law applies. Even if one is certain which
state's common law governs, one is rarely completely certain what the governing law requires be
done to take priority over a subsequent judicial lien creditor of the assignor. For example, if
New York law applies, does Benedict v. Ratner, 268 U.S. 353 (1925), require the assignee to take
dominion over the receivable? Do typical participation arrangements and practices satisfy the
Benedict requirements? The second aspect of perfection implicates the risk that the assignor is
engaging in fraud. Again, assignees take that risk today and rely on the honesty of their
assignors and the assignors' ability and willingness to make good in the case of inadvertent
multiple assignments. There is no title registry for loan participations, and the common law
governing priority in the case of multiple assignments is often uncertain (even if one can
determine which state's common law governs).
60. See R. § 9-309(3).
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require some act to perfect.6 1 It did so not by defining "loan
participation" (a task that proved futile) but rather by defining as an
''account" nearly every type of payment stream the Committee could
think of, other than payment streams represented by chattel paper or
instruments. 62 Treating these rights to payment as accounts had the
effect of imposing a filing requirement for both outright sales and
assignments that secure obligations. It also had the effect of leaving in
the residual category of "payment intangibles" the right to repayment
63
of a loan.
But what about the integrity of the filing system and the need for
public notice? Every potential buyer of a loan participation from a
bank knows that the bank sells participations. The filing of a financing
statement covering "general intangibles" or "loan" gives no
information. Even a financing statement that describes a particular
loan is unlikely to give sufficient information to justify the delay that
might result if sales of participations routinely were preceded by a
search of the files against the seller. Under the Former Article, a
prospective buyer of a loan participation had no way to insure that it
was buying something that had not been sold before. Participants
took this risk and were forced to rely on the honesty of the seller
(often the lead bank that made the loan to the borrower) to minimize
it. Revised Article 9's automatic-perfection rule applicable to sales of
payment intangibles does not exacerbate the situation. On the other
hand, by expanding the category of accounts, Revised Article 9
increases the sale transactions in which filing is required as a
condition of perfection. In some cases, doubt may arise concerning
whether the collateral is a payment intangible or account or, if the
collateral is a payment intangible, whether the transaction is a sale or
an assignment that secures an obligation. 64 The parties most likely to
61. A security interest arising from the sale of an account, chattel paper, or an instrument
(other than a promissory note) may be perfected by filing. See id. §§ 9-309(4), 9-310(a), 9-312(a).
A security interest arising from the sale of tangible chattel paper or an instrument (other than a
promissory note) may also be perfected by taking possession of the collateral. See id.
§§ 9-309(4), 9-313(a). A security interest arising from the sale of electronic chattel paper may be
perfected by control. See id. § 9-314(a); see also id. §§ 9-312(e) (providing for temporary
perfection of security interests in instruments), 9-312(g) (same), 9-315(d) (providing for
temporary perfection of security interests in proceeds).
62. Tort claims reduced to contractual obligations constitute an exception that may have
escaped the attention of the Drafting Committee. See id. § 9-109 cmt. 15.
63. A loan evidenced by chattel paper or an instrument is not a "payment intangible." See
id. § 9-102(a)(42) (defining "general intangible"). A loan made under a credit card is an
"account." See id. § 9-102(a)(2) (defining "account").
64. The UCC does not give guidance for distinguishing an outright sale of a receivable
from an assignment for collateral purposes. See id. § 9-109 cmt. 4.
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engage in the assignment of rights to payment are likely to be
sophisticated and to file in doubtful cases. By doing so, for very little
cost they can protect against the possibility that the collateral is an
account or that the transaction is the assignment of a payment
65
intangible to secure an obligation.
B. Sale of Promissory Notes
The Study Committee also gave some consideration to
expanding the scope of Article 9 to include outright sales of
instruments. 66 After questioning whether buyers of instruments
should be exempted from Article 9's filing requirements while buyers
of other rights to payment are not, the Report concluded:
Notwithstanding the possible logic of imposing Article 9 filing
requirements on non-possessory buyers of instruments, the
Committee is reluctant to propose that change without the benefit
of substantial additional investigation. Moreover, it seems unlikely
that such a revision would garner widespread support. It also
probably would necessitate considerably broader transactional
exclusions from67 Article 9 (or its perfection requirements) for sales
of instruments.
The Drafting Committee gave little thought to sales of
instruments until the very end of the revision process. At its last fullscale meeting, in March 1998, the Drafting Committee decided to
include sales of promissory notes, which embody promises to pay, but
not checks and other drafts, which order a person to pay. Once the
decision was made to include sales of promissory notes, the decision
65. Also to protect the expectations of participants in the loan-participation market,
contractual restrictions on assignment of the lender's rights under a loan agreement were
singled out for special treatment. Like restrictions on the assignment of other receivables,
restrictions on these rights are completely ineffective to prevent the creation, attachment,
perfection, or enforcement of a security interest in the receivable which secures the lender's
obligation to a secured party. See id. § 9-406(d). But Revised Article 9 does not displace other
law that gives effect to restrictions on the outright sale of the lender's rights. See id. §§ 9-406(d),
9-408(a)-(b).
66. The Report observed, "If it decides to extend Article 9 to sales of general intangibles,
the Drafting Committee also may wish to consider a further expansion to cover sales of other
rights to payment that often are the subject of financings-instruments." REPORT, supra note 1,
at 47. Under Former Article 9, "instrument" meant a negotiable instrument, as defined in UCC
section 3-104, or any other writing that evidences a right to the payment of money, is not itself a
security agreement or lease, and is of a type that in ordinary course of business is transferred by
delivery with any necessary indorsement or assignment. See U.C.C. § 9-105(1)(i). The definition
in Revised Article 9 is substantially the same. See R. § 9-102(a)(47).
67. REPORT, supra note 1, at 48 (footnote omitted). In the omitted footnote, the Report
observes: "Even in the absence of a filing requirement for sales of instruments, the seller's
retention of possession could, in appropriate circumstances, provide evidence leading to
avoidance of the buyer's interest as a fraudulent transfer." Id. at 48 n.16.
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almost

immediately. The draft then was revised to treat sales of promissory
notes the same as sales of payment intangibles in other respects. For
example, certain sales were excluded from the scope of Revised
9
Article 9 because they are not likely to be financing transactions,6
and legal and contractual restraints on alienation were made
70

ineffective .

Having taken up sales of instruments at the eleventh hour, the

Drafting Committee did not spend much time considering the
ramifications of its decision. Whether otherwise avoidable problems
will arise as a consequence remains to be seen.
C. Insurance

Former Article 9 excluded transfers of "an interest in or claim in
or under any policy of insurance," except as proceeds of other
collateral. 71 Consistent with the Report's recommendation,72 early
73
drafts of Revised Article 9 narrowed the exclusion substantially.

Certain sectors of the insurance industry, most notably the life
insurance industry, objected to the potential inclusion of insurance as
original collateral. We met with representatives of the life insurance
industry to discuss their concerns, nearly all of which related to the
insurer's status as an obligor. In essence, the insurers wanted to be
able to determine with certainty whom to pay to discharge their
obligations under their policies, and they wanted to continue making
that determination in accordance with existing procedures. 74 The

Drafting Committee agreed with us that some of these concerns were
unwarranted (e.g., the concern that an insurer would need to consult

68. See R. § 9-309(4). This rule was chosen for the same reason that sales of payment
intangibles are automatically perfected, so as not to interfere with the loan-participation market.
69. See id. § 9-109(d)(4)-(5), (7).
70. See id. § 9-408.
71. See U.C.C. § 9-104(g).
72. See Recommendation 3, REPORT, supra note 1, at 56 (recommending that the Drafting
Committee give serious consideration to expanding the scope of Article 9 to include security
interests in "most forms of business insurance policies and at least some forms of 'personal'
(e.g., life, health, and disability) insurance").
73. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 9-104(g) (NCCUSL Annual Meeting Draft 1995) (covering security
interests in insurance policies other than those covering healthcare costs, an injury to or
disability of an individual, the loss of employment or income by an individual, or funeral or
burial costs).
74. The insurance-premium-finance industry was concerned that inclusion in Revised
Article 9 would impose upon financers a filing requirement not contained in the non-Article 9
law of most jurisdictions.
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the UCC filings before deciding whom to pay) and that others (e.g.,
the concern that the insurer would be obligated to pay the secured
party upon receipt of a notification of assignment) could be addressed
with special rules that would not require insurers to change their way
of doing business. At its meeting in June 1996, the Drafting
Committee voted five to three in favor of including insurance within
the scope of Revised Article 9.75
Immediately following the vote, we asked for guidance on the
substance of some of the special rules that might be needed. These
preliminary discussions highlighted the complexity that might be
necessary to bring insurance-related collateral into Revised Article 9
without upsetting current practices and prompted the Drafting
Committee to reconsider its decision. On reconsideration, apparently
motivated by the substantial thought required to address this complex
subject properly and the limited time in which to do so, the Drafting
Committee unanimously opposed including insurance policies within
the scope of Revised Article 9. We were asked, however, to consider
any special scope or other provisions that might be necessary to
facilitate the financing of what Revised Article 9 now calls "healthcare-insurance receivables," i.e., rights to payment for health-care
76
goods or services which arise under an insurance policy.
From the perspective of the health-care provider, these
receivables are the equivalent of traditional accounts-rights to
payment for goods sold or services rendered.7 7 Revised Article 9
classifies them as such. 78 Accordingly, the assignment (whether an
outright sale or an assignment to secure an obligation) of health-careinsurance receivables by a provider to a financer is a secured
transaction governed by Revised Article 9. A financing statement
must be filed to perfect the financer's security interest. However,
because the account debtor on a health-care-insurance receivable is
an insurer, and because the Drafting Committee did not wish to upset
established practices concerning the insurer's obligation to pay, some
75. The Drafting Committee's vote did not address the inclusion of consumer insurance
policies as original collateral in Revised Article 9. Representatives of consumer-advocacy
groups opposed the inclusion, particularly of life insurance policies. They preferred instead to
maintain the status quo, under which security interests in rights under life insurance policies are
governed by non-Article 9 law in most jurisdictions. Regulating security interests under nonArticle 9 law, they argued, has the practical effect of making credit secured by insurance policies
much less available than it would be under an Article 9 regime. We agreed, but thought this to
be a cogent reason for bringing these transactions into Revised Article 9.
76. See R. § 9-102(a)(46) (defining "health-care-insurance receivable").
77. See U.C.C. § 9-106 (defining "account").
78. See R. § 9-102(a)(2).
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of the rules ordinarily applicable to account debtors on traditional
accounts, such as trade receivables, were thought to be inappropriate
to account debtors on health-care-insurance receivables. In particular,
Revised Article 9 generally invalidates both contractual and legal
restrictions on assignments of accounts. 79 It provides that,
notwithstanding an agreement or law to the contrary, an account
debtor that has been properly notified that the account has been
assigned may discharge its obligation by paying the assignee but not
by paying the assignor. 0 But although Revised Article 9 overrides
contractual and legal restrictions on assignment with respect to the
creation, attachment, and perfection of a security interest in healthcare-insurance receivables, it does not override these restrictions with
respect to the rights and duties of the account debtor. 81 Thus, other
law, and not Revised Article 9, determines whom an account debtor
on a health-care-insurance receivable must pay to discharge its
82
obligation under an insurance policy.
The term "health-care-insurance receivable" is not limited to
rights enjoyed by providers. The patient's right to payment under its
health-care insurance policy is also a health-care-insurance
receivable.83 It, too, is classified as an "account," even though the
patient's right to payment is not of a type that is included even in the
broader definition of the term in Revised Article 9.84 Thus, Revised
Article 9 governs the patient's assignment (both outright and for
collateral purposes) of insurance benefits to his health-care provider.
Such an assignment creates a security interest in an account. To
facilitate the continuation of established practices, however, the
security interest is perfected when it attaches; no filing against the
patient is required. 5 If the provider assigns the right to payment to its
financer, however, the normal filing rules apply.
D. Tort Claims
The Study Committee recommended that the scope of Article 9
be expanded to include security interests in claims (other than claims
79. See id. § 9-406(d) (contractual restrictions), (f) (legal restrictions).
80. See id. § 9-406(a).
81. See id. § 9-408.
82. See id. § 9-406(i) (making Revised section 9-406 inapplicable to the assignment of a
health-care-insurance receivable).
83. See id. § 9-102(a)(46).
84. See id. § 9-102(a)(2) (defining "account").
85. See id. § 9-309(5).
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for personal injury) arising out of tort, to the extent that the claims
are assignable under applicable non-UCC law.86 With relatively little
difficulty, the Drafting Committee decided to follow that recommen-

dation.s, Revised Article 9 governs security interests in an otherwise
assignable "commercial tort claim" as original collateral. 88 All tort
claims of organizations are commercial tort claims. 89 As for tort claims

of individuals, only those that arise in the course of the claimant's
business or profession and do not include damages arising out of
personal injury to or the death of the claimant are commercial tort

claims. 0
Revised Article 9 includes very few special rules governing
commercial tort claims. One set reflects that tortfeasors are not

typical of those who owe money. Unlike most unreified rights to
payment, a "commercial tort claim" is neither an account nor a
general intangible; 91 it is a separate type of collateral. Because the

tortfeasor is not an "account debtor,"9 2 notification of an assignment
does not affect the tortfeasor's obligation to pay unless other law so
provides. 93 Moreover, Revised Article 9's free-assignability
provisions, which generally override any contract or non-Article 9 law
restricting assignment of a right to payment, do not extend to
assignments of commercial tort claims. 94
Another set of special rules for commercial tort claims was
designed to reduce the likelihood that a debtor inadvertently will

encumber a tort claim. Unlike most collateral, which may be
described in a security agreement by type (e.g., "all general

intangibles"), a commercial tort claim must be described with greater
specificity (e.g., "all tort claims arising out of the explosion at my
86. See Recommendation 4.A., REPORT, supra note 1, at 58.
87. The Drafting Committee benefited from the generous cooperation of Hugh E.
Reynolds, liaison to the Drafting Committee from the Tort and Insurance Practice Section of
the American Bar Association.
88. See R. §§ 9-109(d)(12) (excluding assignments of a claim arising in tort, other than a
commercial tort claim), 9-401(a) (providing that law other than Revised Article 9 determines
whether a debtor's rights in collateral may be transferred).
89. See id. § 9-102(a)(13)(A); see also U.C.C. § 1-201(28) (defining "organization").
90. See R. § 9-102(a)(13)(B). The Study Committee also recommended that the Drafting
Committee consider seriously whether to expand the scope of Article 9 to include security
interests in claims for personal injury arising out of tort. See Recommendation 4.B., REPORT,
supra note 1, at 58. The Drafting Committee decided against this expansion.
91. See R. § 9-102(a)(2) (defining "account"), (a)(42) (defining "general intangible").
92. See id. § 9-102(a)(3) (defining "account debtor").
93. Cf. id. § 9-406(a) (providing that after notification of an assignment, an account debtor
may discharge its obligation by paying the assignee but not by paying the assignor).
94. See id. §§ 9-401, 9-406(d), (f), 9-407 to 9-409.

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74:1357

factory on May 5 of the present year"). 9 Consistent with this
approach, a security interest does not attach to after-acquired tort
claims.

96

Finally, the comments reflect the Study Committee's recommendation that Article 9 or the official comments "be revised to make
clear that Article 9 applies to security interests in rights to payment
that derive from claims arising out of tort (e.g., rights to payment
under a settlement agreement or a promissory note given to evidence
97
liability in tort)."
E. Deposit Accounts
As we discussed above in Part II, Revised Article 9 generally
follows the Study Committee's recommendation that debtors be free
to use deposit accounts as original collateral under the Article. The
Study Committee recognized that including deposit accounts as
original collateral "undoubtedly would raise a host of other difficult
legal issues. '98 In addition to the exclusion for consumer transactions
and the perfection and "take free" rules described above, the
inclusion of deposit accounts as original collateral required the
promulgation of special rules governing choice of law, 99 priority, °° the
rights of the bank at which the deposit account is maintained,10 1 and
enforcement. 10 2 It also contributed to the very complicated rules
governing priority in proceeds. 013 Nevertheless, we would like to
believe that "these complexities do indeed fit together, and snugly."'1
F. Fixtures and Other Real Property
Article 9 applies primarily to personal property. However, it also
implicates interests in real property. For example, it applies to
security interests in fixtures and to security interests in notes secured
by mortgages of real property. Of the many recommendations
95. See id. § 9-108(b)(3), (e)(1).
96. See id. § 9-204(b)(2).
97. Recommendation 4.C., REPORT, supra note 1, at 58; see R. § 9-109 cmt. 15.
98. REPORT, supra note 1, at 69.
99. See R. § 9-304.
100. See id. § 9-327.
101. See id. §§ 9-340 to 9-342.
102. See id. § 9-607(a)(4)-(5).
103. See id. § 9-322(c)-(e). These rules are discussed below in Part IV.A.3 and in Markell,
supra note 33, at 989-91.
104. Markell, supra note 33, at 1027.
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concerning the interplay between Article 9 and the law of real
property which arose from the Study Committee process, the most
controversial surely was the recommendation that Article 9 provide
that perfection in a note or other obligation secured by real property
be achieved by perfection as to the obligation under Article 9 in the
same manner as if the obligation were not secured by the real
property.105 The controversy was enhanced when, very early in the
process, the Drafting Committee decided that filing would become a
method of perfecting security interests in a mortgage note or other
106
instrument.
From the outset, we considered the Study Committee's recommendation to be wholly unremarkable. The prevailing non-UCC law
long has been that a mortgage is incident to any note it secures; rights
in the mortgage follow ownership of the note. 107 It follows that if an
assignee acquires rights in the note that are senior to those of the
assignor's other creditors, the rights in the mortgage likewise are
senior. Unfortunately, Former Article 9 did not address the point
directly, and the official comment to Former section 9-102 led to
substantial confusion and uncertainty. The Study Committee's recommendation was simply that Revised Article 9 eliminate the confusion
that had developed under the Former Article. We were quite
surprised by the vehemence of the objections raised to codification of
what we thought to be a relatively simple and virtually undisputed
principle.
Through discussions with the organized real-property bar,
including representatives of the American Bar Association Section of
Real Property, Probate, and Trust and the American College of Real
Estate Lawyers, we discovered that a host of other issues had become
entangled with the one implicated by the recommendation. Chief
among these was the same "whom do I pay" issue that the Drafting
Committee grappled with in a variety of other right-to-payment
contexts, such as deposit accounts, letters of credit, and health-careinsurance receivables. The principal concern was for mortgagors who
would not know whom to pay in order to discharge their obligations
on the note. If perfection of a security interest in a mortgage note
could be achieved by filing, and if an assignee need not record an
105. See Recommendation 5.B., REPORT, supra note 1, at 61.
106. See supra text accompanying notes 13-16.
107. See, e.g., Carpenter v. Longan, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 271, 275 (1872) ("An assignment of
the note carries the mortgage with it, while an assignment of the latter alone is a nullity.");
David G. Epstein, Security Transfers by Secured Parties,4 GA. L. REV. 527, 534 (1970).
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assignment of the mortgage in the real property records in order to
ensure perfection, we were asked repeatedly, how would a
homeowner or other mortgagor know whom to pay? The proposed
revision of Article 9, we were told, would exacerbate the risk of a
mortgagor having to pay the mortgage debt twice.
Of course, nothing could be further from the truth. The law of
obligations determines whom an obligor must pay to discharge the
obligation. Revised section 9-406, which applies to obligations that
are not evidenced by an "instrument," is part of the law of
obligations. It contains the "notification" rule that the real-property
bar advocated: The account debtor can discharge its obligation by
paying the original obligee until but not after the account debtor
receives notification that the right to payment has been assigned;
after notification, payment to the assignee will discharge the
obligation, but payment to the assignor will not.1° Neither the filing of
a financing statement nor the recording of an assignment of mortgage
affects this rule. 109
If the obligation is embodied in an instrument, law other than
Article 9 governs. If the instrument is not negotiable, that law is the
common law. According to the Restatement of Mortgages, most
reported decisions "giv[e] the mortgagor no credit for payments
innocently made to the mortgagee" after the mortgage note has been
transferred. 110 Nevertheless, the Restatement rejects that view as
''completely impractical" and as having "the potential for great
injustice to mortgagors." 11 It adopts a "notification" rule instead."2
As with the notification rule under Revised Article 9, neither the
filing of a financing statement nor the recording of an assignment of
mortgage affects the mortgagor's obligation to pay." 3 If the
instrument is negotiable, the "merger" principle will apply. Under
108. See R. § 9-406(a).
109. This discussion assumes the absence of legislation overriding Revised Article 9 and
creating a different rule for discharging obligations on mortgage notes.

110. See RESTATEMENT

(THIRD) OF PROPERTY (MORTGAGES)

§ 5.5 cmt. a, at 391 (1997).

111. Id.
112. "Except as otherwise provided by the Uniform Commercial Code, after transfer of an
obligation secured by a mortgage, performance of the obligation to the transferor is effective
against the transferee if rendered before the obligor receives notice of the transfer." Id. § 5.5, at

390.
113. See R. § 9-406(a) (account debtor may discharge his obligation by paying the assignor

"until, but not after, the account debtor receives a notification" of assignment); U.C.C.
§ 1-201(26) (person "receives" a notification when it comes to his attention or is duly delivered);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY (MORTGAGES) § 5.5 cmt. c, at 395. However, a
comment to the Restatement suggests that recordation of an assignment of mortgage imparts
notice to a grantee who buys the mortgaged land after recordation. See id.
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this principle, the obligation is bound up in and transferred with the
paper on which it is written; notification is irrelevant. UCC Article 3
follows the merger principle. It provides that the makers' obligation
on a negotiable note may be discharged by paying a person entitled to
enforce the instrument ("PETE")."4 To qualify as a PETE, a person
normally must be in possession of the instrument.'15 Thus, if the
mortgagee assigns the mortgage note but the assignee does not take
possession, the note can be discharged by paying the mortgagee as if
no assignment had been made. Payment to the assignee will not
discharge the obligation. As under the Restatement and Article 9,
neither the filing of a financing statement nor the recording of an
assignment of mortgage affects this rule.
In short, Revised Article 9 leaves the law of obligations, and the
obligations of a mortgagor, exactly where they were. In the end, the
real-property bar acknowledged this and turned their attention to
repeal of the merger rule in Article 3. Although the leadership of
NCCUSL added this issue to the agenda of the Article 9 Drafting
Committee, it did so very near the end of the drafting process. In
conjunction with its consideration of expanding the scope of Article 9
to include sales of promissory notes, at its last full meeting the
Drafting Committee considered the "whom to pay" issue. Although
there appeared to be general support for the notification rule, the
Drafting Committee was reluctant to recommend overturning a
fundamental principle of negotiable instruments law without
sufficient time to consider all the ramifications of the change. In
particular, it was unable to reach consensus on how broadly the
merger principle should be supplanted (e.g., should the notification
rule apply to all notes secured by real property? all secured notes? all
installment notes?) or on the statutory mechanism for making the
change. The issue, which continues to draw great interest from the
real-property bar, remains on NCCUSL's agenda. It has been
assigned to the Drafting Committee to Revise UCC Article 1.116
The Drafting Committee also decided not to limit to realproperty collateral its codification of the principle that the collateral
follows the debt. Revised Article 9 is intended to make clear that this
114. See U.C.C. § 3-412. The obligation also runs to an indorser who paid the instrument
after dishonor. See id.
115. See id. § 3-301 (defining "person entitled to enforce").
116. For a detailed chronology of the efforts to ensure that the notification rule applies to all
mortgage notes, both negotiable and nonnegotiable, see Dale A. Whitman, Reforming the Law:
The Payment Rule as a Paradigm,1998 BYU L. REV. 1169.
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principle applies to attachment and perfection of security interests in
all secured obligations, whether secured by personal property or real
property. 117 Only time will tell whether it ultimately will succeed in
doing so. There is a risk to codifying this basic common-law principle.
A court may assume that because "everyone knows" that the
collateral follows the debt, the new statutory provisions must mean
something at least a little different.1 18 That something different may
be inconsistent with Revised Article 9.
III. ARTICLE 9 FILING SYSTEMS AND THE INTERACTION OF ARTICLE
9 WITH NON-UCC LAW
In Hard Choices we spoke approvingly of the Study Committee's
willingness to address matters that are outside the UCC but affect
secured transactions. We praised "the reluctance of the current group
of UCC law reformers to shy away from goals that are more
ambitious than revisions to statutory text." 11 9 In this connection, we
referred to the Study Committee's recommendations that the
sponsors of the UCC "encourage and support the ongoing efforts to
improve and make more uniform the various state systems for filing
...

and conducting searches[;]""12

that the perfection, priority, and

enforcement provisions of Article 9 be extended to statutory
agricultural liens;1 21 and that federal law governing copyrights,
patents, and other intellectual property be revised, and federal
recording systems for interests in intellectual property be reformed,
122
to facilitate secured transactions.
A. Improving the Filing System
To a considerable extent, the sponsors and Drafting Committee
had the ability to implement the first two of these recommendations
in the statute itself, and they rose to the occasion. Revised Article 9
contains several provisions that promote efficiency and uniformity in
the operations of filing offices. For example, Revised sections 9-516

117. See R. §§ 9-203(g), 9-308(e).
118. Leaving to the common law the articulation of fundamental principles underlying
commercial law also poses a risk. See Steven L. Harris, Using Fundamental Principles of
Commercial Law to Decide UCC Cases, 26 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 637 (1993).
119. Harris & Mooney, supra note 1, at 575.
120. Recommendation 11.A., REPORT, supra note 1, at 88.
121. See Recommendation 24.A., id., at 181.
122. See Recommendations 2.A.-F., id., at 50-51.
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and 9-520 underscore that filing offices serve a ministerial, rather than
regulatory, function. Taken together, they contain an exclusive list of
grounds for rejecting a financing statement or other record that is
communicated to a filing office 123 and require a filing office that
rejects a record to promptly inform the filer of the fact of and reason
for the rejection. 124 To further insure that filers of written financing
statements are not burdened by idiosyncratic requirements imposed
by individual filing offices, Revised section 9-521 contains forms for
initial financing statements and amendments which each filing office
must accept (assuming it accepts written records). Revised section
9-519(f) facilitates searches of the public records by requiring a filing
office to be capable of retrieving an initial financing statement and all
amendments and other filed records relating to it either by the
debtor's name or by the file number assigned to the initial financing
statement. 125 Revised section 9-523 increases the utility of responses
to search requests by requiring a filing office to respond to requests
126
promptly and with current and complete information.
The Drafting Committee realized that dictating the minimum
services a filing office must provide and setting the minimum
performance standards for providing those services are appropriate
subjects for legislation, but specifying the details of day-to-day filingoffice operations is not. Detailed procedures specified in statutes
cannot be changed easily enough to enable filing offices to adjust to
changes in filing load, personnel, and technology. Particularly given
the substantial differences among Article 9 filing offices (in their
current operations, in the quantity of filings processed, and in the
number of employees who do the processing), imposing absolute
uniformity of practices and procedures would be both unnecessary
and unwise. Yet, because filers and searchers often deal with many
filing offices, great value would come from having filing-office
practices and procedures be harmonious with one another. Revised
section 9-526 is a useful step toward realizing that value. This section

123. See R. §§ 9-520(a), 9-516(b).
124. See id. § 9-520(b) (requiring filing office to act not later than two business days after it
receives the record).
125. A filing office must assign a unique number to each filed record. See id. § 9-519(a)(1).
The "file number" is the number assigned to an initial financing statement. See id.
§ 9-102(a)(36) (defining "file number").
126. See id. § 9-523(c)(1) (requiring filing office to communicate, upon request, the
information provided in financing statements on file as of a date no earlier than three business
days before filing office receives the request), (e) (requiring filing office to act not later than two
business days after it receives the request).
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requires the adoption and publication of filing-office rules after
consultation with other filing offices and after consideration of the
rules and practices of, and technology used by, other Article 9 filing
offices. Revised section 9-526 requires the rule-adopting official or
agency also to consult the Model Rules promulgated by the
International Association of Corporate Administrators ("IACA"), an
organization of administrators responsible for statewide corporate
127
and UCC filings.
The process leading to the promulgation of the Model Rules
demonstrates the value of the sponsors' working with other interested
groups towards improving matters that cannot be addressed usefully
by statute. Links between Article 9's sponsors and IACA began to
form as early as 1991, when Harry C. Sigman, a member of the Study
Committee, addressed an IACA annual meeting about efforts to
128
revise Article 9. Funding provided by the Article 9 Filing Project
enabled Mr. Sigman and other experts in Article 9 to meet regularly
with JACA members and assist them in fashioning the Model Rules
during the succeeding years. Input from filing officers was not limited
to formulation of the Model Rules. After the filing provisions of
Revised Article 9 took shape, we met with a small group of filing
officers to discuss the provisions in detail, and we engaged in many email exchanges with filing officers throughout the revision process.
The beneficial effects of the filing officers' participation in the
process are likely to extend well beyond Revised Article 9 and the
Model Rules. Filing officers not only became better educated about
the needs of those who use the system but also, for the first time,
systematically shared with one another their ideas about, and
experiences with, a wide range of software and hardware products.
The information and insights gained from IACA-related discussions
already has enabled several filing offices to modernize and improve
their operations. Perhaps most important, the filing officers appear to
have come away from the revision project with an appreciation that
they are engaged in a common enterprise under a uniform law. This
constructive attitude bodes well for improved filing-office operations
under Revised Article 9.
Other efforts stimulated by the revision also are likely to
contribute to progress toward making the Article 9 filing systems
127. The final version of the Model Rules is expected to be promulgated by the end of 1999.
128. NCCUSL established the Article 9 Filing Project at the University of Minnesota to
study and address problems with the filing system and to promote nonstatutory solutions, such
as the promulgation of filing-office rules.
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uniform. Of particular note are the standards for UCC electronic

filing promulgated by the American National Standards Institute
("ANSI").

29 These

standards, along with an Implementation Guide, 30

will assist filing offices in implementing an electronic filing system
under Article 9. A version of the Implementation Guide suitable for
use with Revised Article 9 is expected to appear shortly. This version

will facilitate a quick transition to Revised Article 9 and, for those
filing offices that have not yet gone on line by Revised Article 9's
effective date of July 1, 2001,111 to electronic filing.
B. AgriculturalFinancing
The sponsors were successful in reaching outside their own
organizations also when fashioning the treatment of statutory
agricultural liens. As we noted in Hard Choices, two American Bar

Association task forces invested much time and thought into
proposals for improving Article 9's treatment of agricultural finance

32
and regularizing the treatment of statutory agricultural liens.

Revised Article 9 adopts many of the recommendations of those task
forces. Several of its provisions clarify or otherwise improve the law
133
applicable to security interests in agricultural collateral.
Despite years of work, and despite what appeared to be a widely

shared view that Former section 9-312(2) was unworkable,' 14 neither
the Drafting Committee nor the ABA task forces succeeded in
forging a consensus among themselves or among the interested

groups on one important question relating to agricultural finance: to
what extent, if any, should Revised Article 9 afford priority to
security interests in crops that secure new value (e.g., seed or

129. Transaction Set 154 of ANSI X12 relates to electronic UCC filings.
130. An Implementation Guide for use with the Former Article was approved by the
Secured Transactions Section of IACA in 1999.
131. See R. § 9-701. For a discussion of the rules governing the transition to the revised
Article, see Bradley Y. Smith, New Article 9 Transition Rules, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1339
(1999).
132. See Harris & Mooney, supra note 1, at 576.
133. Compare U.C.C. § 9-109(3) (definition of "farm products") with R. § 9-102(a)(34)
(revised definition of "farm products"). See R. § 9-324(d) (new priority for purchase-money
security interests in livestock). Compare U.C.C. §§ 9-203(1)(a); and 9-402(1) (requiring security
agreement and financing statement covering crops to describe the real property concerned) with
R. §§ 9-203(b)(3)(A); and 9-502(a)-(b) (containing no such requirements). Compare U.C.C.
§ 9-401(1) (second and third alternatives) (requiring local filing to perfect a security interest in
crops) with R. § 9-501(a) (requiring filing in central filing office).
134. Former section 9-312(2) afforded special priority to those who provide secured credit
that enables a debtor to produce crops.
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fertilizer) that is used in the production of the crops? Apparently
recognizing that the fifty state legislatures were no more likely than
other groups to agree about the desirability of a special priority for

"production-money

security interests" ("PrMSIs"), the Drafting

Committee decided that the provisions for PrMSI priority should be

presented to the states as optional. This proposal was met with a
campaign orchestrated by the American Bankers Association against
the provisions in fall 1997. Despite its intensity,1 35 the campaign was of
limited effect. The draft preceding the hubbub presented the PrMSI
provisions in bracketed sections, each accompanied by a Legislative
Note indicating that "This section is optional.1' 3 6 Ultimately, the
brackets surrounding the provisions were removed, and the
provisions were relocated to Appendix II, which refers to them as
"model provisions."
Perhaps the most significant aspect of Revised Article 9 as it
relates to agricultural financing concerns the scope of the revised
Article. Many of the provisions relating to perfection by filing,
priority, and enforcement apply not only to consensual security
interests but also to the vast array of "agricultural liens" created by
statute in each state.137 These provisions afford a clear, easy, and
uniform way for a holder of any one of these diverse agricultural liens
to obtain priority over the debtor's judicial lien creditors and
bankruptcy trustee,1 38 to ascertain the agricultural lien's priority as
135. Along with the members of the Drafting Committee, we were subjected to a barrage of
more than a thousand "form" letters arguing against the inclusion of any PrMSI rules in Revised
Article 9. It was not uncommon for a single bank to have sent several pieces of mail, the
contents of which were identical save for the name and signature of the individual bank officer
or employee. The quantity was so great that the postal service reportedly refused to continue
delivering mail to one Drafting Committee member, who was asked to pick up the mail at the
post office instead.
136. U.C.C. §§ 9-105, 9-321 (Reporters' Interim Draft Aug. 7, 1997).
137. "Agricultural lien" means an interest, other than a security interest, in farm
products:
(A) which secures payment or performance of an obligation for:
(i) goods or services furnished in connection with a debtor's farming operation;
or
(ii)rent on real property leased by a debtor in connection with its farming
operation;
(B) which is created by statute in favor of a person that:
(i) in the ordinary course of its business furnished goods or services to a debtor
in connection with a debtor's farming operation; or
(ii) leased real property to a debtor in connection with the debtor's farming
operation; and
(C) whose effectiveness does not depend on the person's possession of the personal
property.
R. § 9-102(a)(5).
138. See id. §§ 9-310(a) (financing statement must be filed to perfect agricultural lien),
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against conflicting security interests and agricultural liens in the same
collateral,3 9 and to enforce the agricultural lien.140 At the same time,
by subjecting agricultural liens to Article 9's filing requirements,
Revised Article 9 enables potential secured lenders to ascertain with
ease and at low cost, by searching the Article 9 filing records, whether
farm products previously have been encumbered with an agricultural
lien. 41 This statutory approach proved so popular that some people
questioned why it should be limited to agricultural liens on farm

products. They urged the Drafting Committee to extend the
perfection and priority provisions of Revised Article 9 to cover all
nonpossessory statutory liens on all kinds of collateral. 142 The
potential advantages of such an expansion of Article 9's scope were
evident. However, the world of nonagricultural, nonpossessory
statutory liens is vast and, at least to some extent, unknown. Lacking
a practical way of determining all the types of liens that would be
implicated by expanding Revised Article 9 to cover all these liens, the
Drafting Committee understandably declined to proceed.
C. FederalRegulation of IntellectualProperty
The Study Committee's recommendation that the law governing
security interests in copyrights, patents, and other intellectual
property be revised necessarily implicates federal law, which
generally speaking lies outside the bailiwick of the UCC's sponsors.
While the Drafting Committee was revising Article 9 to deal
expressly with software financing and other issues relating to
intellectual property collateral, 143 efforts at making federal
intellectual-property law more conducive to contemporary patterns of
commercial finance continued. These efforts, which have yet to bear
9-317(a)(1) (unperfected agricultural lien is subordinate to rights of a lien creditor),
9-102(a)(52) (defining "lien creditor").
139. See id. § 9-322(a), (g).
140. The holder of an agricultural lien may enforce the agricultural lien under Revised
Article 9 by repossessing and disposing of the collateral or by accepting the collateral in
satisfaction of the obligation it secures. See id. § 9-601(a).
141. See id. § 9-322(a) (affording priority to the first to file or perfect). But see id. § 9-322(g)
(affording priority to later-filed agricultural lien if the statute creating the agricultural lien so
provides).
142. An American Bar Association subcommittee sought more modest change. It
recommended that Revised Article 9 govern only the priority between a nonagricultural
statutory lien and an Article 9 security interest. See REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON RELATION TO OTHER LAW OF THE ABA BUSINESS LAW SECTION
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE COMMITTEE (Oct. 1996).
143. For a discussion of these issues, see Steven 0. Weise, The Financing of Intellectual
Property Under Revised UCC Article 9, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 1077 (1999).
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fruit, have proceeded under the auspices of the American Bar
Association and, more recently, the Commercial Finance

Association.1" We are uncertain whether the involvement of the
UCC's sponsors (assuming it would have been welcome) would have
been a wise allocation of their resources or would have led to
enactment of improved federal legislation. 145 Regardless, we are

disappointed that interested parties have not yet succeeded in
spurring Congress into action.
IV. APPROACHES TO CODIFICATION: FINE LINES, ROUGH JUSTICE,
COMPLEXITY, AND SIMPLICITY IN REVISED ARTICLE 9

The ultimate success of Revised Article 9 will depend not only
on the quality of substantive rules it adopts but also on its appropriate
application by lawyers and judges. Its appropriate application, in turn,
will depend in large part on the way in which the substantive rules are
articulated and organized.
As we noted in Hard Choices:
One of the virtues of Article 9 is that most of its provisions are
readily accessible to lawyers who are familiar with its general
outlines. In revising Article 9, the Drafting Committee will be

expected not only to determine questions of Article 9's policy and
its choices in statutory language that
scope but also to embody
146

preserves its accessibility.
We were mindful of this challenge throughout the drafting
process. And we were not alone. In several contexts the statutory
approach that was taken (or rejected) generated more controversy
than the substance of the rule it articulated. Moreover, we received a
good deal of assistance in making sure that terminology and style
were consistent throughout the revised Article. 47 This consistency
144. The American Bar Association's Joint Task Force on Security Interests in Intellectual
Property, composed of lawyers from the Sections of Business Law and Intellectual Property
Law, is preparing the Federal Intellectual Property Security Act. This Act would govern
security interests in all federally regulated intellectual property, including copyrights and
patents. The Commercial Finance Association, a trade organization of asset-based lenders, is
supporting the enactment of the Security Interests in Copyrights Financing Protection Act,
which, as the name implies, is a more modest reform effort.
145. Some participants in the Article 9 revision process have participated actively in these
federal law-reform efforts, as well. Although the Study Committee took a somewhat more
active role with respect to reform of federal law than did the Drafting Committee, see Harris &
Mooney, supra note 1, at 575, the Drafting Committee had more than enough challenges
without concerning itself with reforming federal law.
146. Id. at 587.
147. For a discussion of the Drafting Committee's efforts in this regard and those of its
simplification task force, see Louis F. Del Duca et al., Simplification in Drafting- The Uniform
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serves to render an already accessible statute even more accessible.
Of course, accessibility requires not only that each individual
sentence be comprehensible but also that users of the statute are able
to find all the relevant provisions and understand how the provisions
relate to one another. Despite widespread satisfaction with much of
the Former Article, Revised Article 9 contains myriad changes. As
one of us quipped during the drafting process, "Everyone agrees that
Article 9 works fairly well and only needs a handful of material
revisions. The problem is that everyone has a different handful."
Even if the inclusion of any single complex provision or set of rules
does not give rise to a serious problem, the sheer number of complex
and detailed rules in the aggregate may.
When taken in the aggregate and in the abstract, the revised
Article may appear forbidding. But articles of the UCC are not
novels, to be read through from beginning to end. Approached in a
given transactional context, Revised Article 9 should prove to be
readily navigable. It has been substantially reorganized with the new
user in mind. That the reorganization was wholeheartedly supported
by experts whose familiarity with (and investment in) the
organization of Former Article 9 vastly exceeds that of the average
user gives us reason to believe that the revised Article's organization
will accomplish its intended purpose.
In Hard Choices we addressed the dichotomy between two
differing paradigms. One would create finely crafted, individualized
statutory lines that seek to work nearly perfect justice over a detailed
taxonomy of circumstances. The other would offer rougher and
blunter, albeit simpler, bright-line rules that, while normatively
suboptimal in some circumstances, would yield the desired result in
the mine run of cases. Of course, the fine lines versus rough justice
dichotomy discussed in Hard Choices is but one of several classes of
drafting choices along a broad spectrum. As one might expect, the
revision includes examples of clear lines, enormous complexity,
purposefully incomplete treatment of issues, general standards for
courts to develop and apply as the circumstances require, and mere
silence, leaving courts to interpolate both standards and results.
In the discussion that follows we provide a few examples of
issues whose complexity tested our ability and that of the Drafting
Committee to maintain the Article's accessibility by avoiding
unnecessary complexity. We also speculate briefly on the likely causes
Commercial Code Article 9 Experience, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1309 (1999).
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of the complexity. We conclude by noting some instances in which the
Drafting Committee chose to address issues with considerably lessin some cases, perhaps too little-detail.
A. (Possibly) Unnecessary Complexity

1. Changes in Business Structure
In Hard Choices we examined the Study Committee's recom-

mendations concerning the effect of certain changes in business
structure on security agreements that contain after-acquired property
provisions. We focused on two paradigmatic examples. The first was
the transfer by an individual owner-operator of a sole proprietorship
(A) of all of the business assets to a newly-formed corporation (B)
owned by the individual. The second was a merger of a corporation

(A) into another (surviving) corporation (B). Each case assumed that
B, the transferee, continues to carry on the business of A, the
transferor. Each case also assumed that A had entered into a security
agreement in favor of SP-A covering all existing and after-acquired
collateral (e.g., accounts and inventory) and that SP-A had filed a
financing statement against A. The principal controversy arose with

respect to collateral acquired by B following the transfer 48 First, to
what extent should the security agreement originally entered into by

A be sufficient to create a security interest in collateral acquired by

B? Second, if the security agreement is so effective, to what extent
should the financing statement filed against A be sufficient to perfect
the security interest in collateral acquired by B? Third, if the security
interest is so perfected, what priority rule should govern a contest
between SP-A's security interest and that of SP-B, in whose favor B
entered into a security agreement?
The Report recommended that the official comments be revised

to indicate that other (i.e., non-Article 9) law governs the answer to
the first question-whether and to what extent the security agreement
148. Related questions concern the effect of the transfer on SP-A's security interest in the
transferred collateral and the effect of a "pure" change of name, i.e., when A's name changes to
B but no new entity is involved. While not completely free from controversy, the resolution of
these issues under Revised Article 9 is similar to that under its predecessor. SP-A's security
interest normally continues in, and a financing statement filed against A continues to be
effective with respect to, the transferred collateral, even if SP-A does not file against B.
Compare R. §§ 9-315(a), 9-507(a) with U.C.C. §§ 9-306(2), 9-402(7) (third sentence). In the case
of a name change, a financing statement filed against A continues to be effective as to collateral
acquired by B within the four-month period after the name change and thereafter only if an
appropriate amendment to the financing statement is filed. Compare R. § 9-507(c) with U.C.C.
§ 9-402(7) (second sentence).

1999]

REFLECTIONS OF THE REPORTERS

originally entered into by A is effective to create a security interest in
property acquired by B. 149 Revised Article 9, however, goes further.
Consistent with the Report's recommendation, the revised Article
provides that a person "becomes bound" as debtor under another
person's security agreement when that result would occur by
operation of other law or by contract. 5 ° Revised Article 9 adds to this
trigger its own, additional, formula for when a person so "becomes
bound" by another person's security agreement. Under Revised
section 9-203, a person (here, B) "becomes bound" if "the person
becomes generally obligated for the obligations of the other person,
including the obligation secured under the security agreement, and
acquires or succeeds to all or substantially all of the assets of the
' 151
other person.
Revised Article 9 follows the Report somewhat more closely
with respect to the second and third questions. 5 2 As to the second
question, under Revised section 9-508 SP-A's financing statement
filed against A would remain effective to perfect its security interest
in collateral acquired by B during the four-month period after B
became bound by A's security agreement. The financing statement
would remain effective to perfect the security interest in collateral
acquired by B thereafter only if, during the four-month period, SP-A
153
files a new initial financing statement against B.
As recognized in the Report, maintaining SP-A's perfected
security interest in collateral acquired by B necessitates new priority
rules in order to answer the third question. Basing priority on the
timing of financing statements filed by SP-A and SP-B against
different debtors would make no sense. 5 4 Revised section 9-326
contains the new rules applicable to this variation of the "doubledebtor" problem. Under that section, a security interest perfected by
a financing statement that is effective solely under Revised section
9-508 generally is subordinate to security interests perfected by
another method. 51 It follows that SP-B's security interest ordinarily
would have priority. There are exceptions to this general
149. See Recommendation 17.D., REPORT, supra note 1, at 142-43.
150. See R. § 9-203(d)(1).
151. Id. § 9-203(d)(2).
152. See Recommendation 17.E.-F., REPORT, supra note 1,at 143-48.
153. See R. § 9-508(b).
154. See Steven L. Harris, The Interaction of Articles 6 and 9 of the Uniform Commercial
Code: A Study in Conveyancing, Priorities,and Code Interpretation,39 VAND. L. REV. 179, 22225 (1986).
155. See R. § 9-326(a).
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subordination, however. As among security interests perfected solely
under Revised section 9-508 (e.g., as among SP-A and other secured
creditors of A), the other priority rules of Revised Article 9 apply
(e.g., the first-to-file-or-perfect rule of Revised section 9-322).156
Moreover, there is an exception to the exception. If security interests
so perfected were not created by security agreements entered into by
the same debtor (e.g., if B became bound by a security agreement
originally entered into by C in favor of SP-C as well as by the security
agreement entered into by A in favor of SP-A), the priority is
governed by "priority in time of the new debtor's having become
bound."1" 7 The latter exception reflects another necessary
accommodation of the "double-debtor" problem.
The effort to protect the (possibly) unwitting SP-A from the risk
that B, as a new debtor, might become bound by A's security
agreement obviously has resulted in substantial additional
complexity. Even so, the approach taken in Revised sections 9-326
and 9-508 does not provide a complete resolution of SP-A's problems.
For example, it may be purely fortuitous whether perfection of
security interests in B's after-acquired collateral is governed by the
law of the jurisdiction whose law governed perfection of SP-A's
security interest in A's collateral. Assume that, for choice-of-law
purposes under Revised Article 9, A is located in State X and B is
located in State y.158 SP-A's financing statement filed in State X
against A would not perfect SP-A's security interest in B's afteracquired collateral. Although SP-A's financing statement would
continue to be effective under Revised section 9-508, it would not
perfect SP-A's security interest in B's collateral because it is not filed
in State Y, the jurisdiction in which B is located.'59 Revised section
9-316(a) would maintain for up to one year the perfection of SP-A's
security interest in collateral transferredby A to B, notwithstanding a
change in governing law. But that provision relates only to perfected
security interests, which, by definition, have attached;16 it does not
161
apply to collateral acquired after the change in applicable law.
156. See id. § 9-326(b).
157. Id.
158. Revised section 9-307 determines where a debtor is located for purposes of Revised
Article 9's choice-of-law rules.
159. See R. § 9-301(1).
160. See id. § 9-308(a) (security interest is perfected if it has attached and the applicable
requirements for perfection have been satisfied).
161. See id. § 9-316 cmt. 2 example 5. The result is the same under Former Article 9. See
U.C.C. § 9-103(1)(d), (3)(e).
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One reasonably might question whether the extensive effort to
address these was justified. We certainly did during the deliberations
of both the Study Committee and the Drafting Committee, ultimately
to no avail. In our view, were SP-A actually relying on the afteracquired collateral, normally Article 9 would not be asking too much
of SP-A to insist that it discover that a new debtor has entered (or is
about to enter) the picture. We recognize, however, that how one
evaluates these rules relating to changes in business structure may
turn on the paradigm that one chooses to emphasize or believes to be
the most typical. In the case of the corporate merger, it is a fairly safe
bet that customary due diligence and the involvement of lawyers
would result in SP-A's consent being sought and its rights protected.
Those who focus on the sole proprietor who incorporates a small
business may view the prospects for SP-A to protect itself as
materially jeopardized without something like the statutory structure
provided in Revised Article 9.
2. Priorities in Proceeds of Collateral to Which Nontemporal Priority
Rules Apply
Former Article 9 dealt with priorities in proceeds in substantially
the same way that it dealt with priorities in original collateral. Under
Former section 9-312(6), for purposes of the first-to-file-or-perfect
priority rule of Former section 9-312(5), the date of filing or
perfection for original collateral also was the date for proceeds of the
collateral. With one material exception-proceeds of collateral
subject to a purchase money security interest under Former section
9-312(3) or (4)-the Former Article otherwise was silent on the
priority of security interests in proceeds. 16 2 The effect of this silence,
however, was to make applicable the first-to-file-or-perfect rule.
During the drafting process the Drafting Committee considered
several existing and newly proposed "nontemporal" priority rulesi.e., those not based on priority in time. 163 These included priority
rules for security interests in deposit accounts (Revised section
9-327), investment property (Revised section 9-328), letter-of-credit
rights (Revised section 9-329), chattel paper and instruments
(Revised section 9-330), and collateral subject to special priority rules
162. One other exception was Former section 9-306(5), dealing with returned and
repossessed goods.
163. For a discussion of nontemporal priority rules in Revised Article 9, see Randal C.
Picker, Perfection Hierarchies and Nontemporal Priority Rules, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1157
(1999).
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under Articles 3, 7, and 8 (Revised section 9-331). Because the special
priority afforded by these rules is not temporal, some expressed
concern that the priority would not carry over to proceeds. Indeed,
both Former section 9-312(5) and (6) and Revised section 9-322(a)
and (b) indicate that, in the absence of a contrary provision, the firstto-file-or-perfect rule, not the relevant nontemporal priority rule,
would apply to proceeds. Moreover, inasmuch as filing is not a
permissible method of perfection for certain types of collateral
covered by these nontemporal rules, the time of perfection would
control priority.164 Because perfection is conditioned upon
attachment, which is conditioned in turn upon the debtor's having
rights in the collateral, perfection in proceeds of those types of
collateral would not occur until the proceeds came into being as
1 65

such.

In addition to concerns about the inapplicability of the
nontemporal rules to proceeds, the prospect of fully extending the
reach of the temporal priority rules to proceeds also generated
concerns. For example, assume that on June 1 SP-1 perfects its
security interest in a debtor's deposit account by control, on July 1
SP-2 perfects its security interest in the debtor's inventory by filing,
and on August 1 SP-1 files a financing statement covering inventory.
The debtor then uses cash from the deposit account to purchase new
inventory. Under the first-to-file-or-perfect rule, SP-1's security
interest would have priority over that of SP-2, even though SP-2 filed
first and a search failed to turn up SP-1's filing (which had not yet
been made). This effect, the Drafting Committee believed, would
undermine the filing system.
The solution reached by the Drafting Committee is an
enormously complex and opaque set of priority rules found in
subsections (c), (d), and (e) of Revised section 9-322.166 The upshot is
generally to extend the nontemporal priority to most proceeds, 167 but
to apply a new first-to-file (not first-to-file-or-perfect) priority rule to
proceeds consisting of the types of collateral for which filing is the
typical means of perfection.168
Only time and experience will reveal whether the benefits of the
164. See R. §§ 9-327 (deposit accounts), 9-329 (letter-of-credit rights).
165. See id. §§ 9-203(b)(2), 9-308(a).
166. For a general explanation of these rules, see R. § 9-322 cmts. 7-9. For an explanation
focusing on the rules' application to deposit accounts, see Markell, supra note 33, at 991-1000.
167. See R. § 9-322(c).
168. See id. § 9-322(d)-(e).
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new rules on proceeds priorities outweigh the costs of complexity. If
the rules were implicated only in the unusual case we would be much
less concerned. However, as we explained above, one must confront
and understand this scheme to reach the conclusion that the first-tofile secured party claiming inventory or equipment will also have
priority in after-acquired inventory or equipment purchased with cash
proceeds of an encumbered deposit account-a scenario that may
become very typical.
3. The New Taxonomy of Receivables and Receivables-Related
Provisions
Former Article 9 classified collateral consisting of rights to
payment into only four types: accounts, chattel paper, instruments,
and general intangibles. 169 Nevertheless, as anyone who has taught a
law school course on secured transactions knows well, this
definitional structure and its treatment under Article 9 are both hard
to teach and hard to learn. That said, the expanded receivablesrelated definitional structure found in Revised Article 9 is
substantially more complex. Revised Article 9 contains seven
principal types of collateral consisting of rights to payment: accounts
(which include health-care-insurance reveivables and certain kinds of
as-extracted collateral), chattel paper (which is subdivided into
electronic chattel paper and tangible chattel paper), instruments
(subdivided into promissory notes and other instruments), letter-ofcredit rights, payment intangibles, supporting obligations, and
commercial tort claims. If one counts the subcategories (i.e., asextracted collateral, health-care-insurance reveivables, electronic
chattel paper, tangible chattel paper, and promissory notes), there are
twelve types of rights to payment under the revised Article.
Obviously, the Drafting Committee did not create this structure
just to make courses in secured transactions more challenging. The
separately defined terms are needed for special rules, or special
carve-outs from rules, applicable to a particular type of receivable.
The definitional structure is merely the tip of the iceberg.
Some of the receivables-related types of collateral are defined
specially to accommodate special concerns of obligors on certain
169. See U.C.C. §§ 9-105(1)(b) (defining "chattel paper"), (i) (defining "instrument"), 9-106
(defining "account" and "general intangible"). Although some general intangibles consist
primarily of a right to payment, the term as defined is much broader. For purposes of this
discussion we have not included deposit accounts as a type of receivable, even though a deposit
account consists of a right to payment.
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rights to payment (among other reasons). For example, as we
discussed above, insurers obligated on health-care-insurance
reveivables are not subject to the usual rules applicable to account
debtors on other accounts.1 70 Other definitions facilitate provisions for
various methods of perfection. A security interest in electronic chattel
paper, for example, may be perfected by filing or control, whereas
perfection with respect to tangible chattel paper requires either filing
or possession.17 ' Security interests arising out of the sale of a payment
intangible or promissory note are automatically perfected upon
attachment; this approach necessitated the inclusion in the definition
of "account" many rights to payment that would have been general
intangibles under the Former Article. 17 2 Security interests in
supporting obligations attach and are perfected automatically upon
attachment and perfection with respect to the underlying, supported
obligation. 173 Security interests in letter-of-credit rights may be
perfected only by control, except insofar as they constitute support
letter-of-credit rights differs
obligations.174 The method of control for
75
from that for electronic chattel paper.
As the drafting process progressed, there was little serious
disagreement on the need for special treatment with respect to certain
rights to payment and, consequently, the need for the plethora of new
and newly refined definitions. In this context, most viewed the web of
as necessary
that emerged
definitions
receivables-related
complexity-the price, perhaps, of the broad scope of Revised Article
9. Necessary as these provisions may be, they are complex
nonetheless.
4. Complexity in Context
Rather than numbly bemoaning the complexity of Revised
Article 9, we think it worth speculating on some of its underlying
causes. Certainly the Drafting Committee did not set out to make the
170. See R. § 9-406(i). Persons obligated on a letter of credit also are treated specially. See
id. § 9-409.
171. See id. §§ 9-312(a), 9-313(a), 9-314(a).
172. See id. § 9-309(3)-(4); see also supra text accompanying notes 60-65, 68-70 (discussing
the background of these provisions).
173. See R. §§ 9-203(f), 9-308(d).
174. See id. §§ 9-308(d), 9-312(b)(2).
175. Compare id. § 9-107 (control of letter-of-credit right) with id. § 9-105 (control of
electronic chattel paper). For a discussion of this and other aspects of Revised Article 9's
treatment of electronic chattel paper, see Jane Kaufman Winn, Electronic Chattel Paper Under
Revised Article 9: Updating the Concept of Embodied Rights for Electronic Commerce, 74 CHI.KENT L. REv. 1055 (1999).
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Article more complex. Nor did we. Some complexities correspond to
the complexity of the transactions and financing patterns that Revised
Article 9 addresses. Although Article 9 always has had to deal with
complex transactions to some extent, we suspect that the very success
of Article 9 has resulted in a substantial increase in the sophistication
of secured transactions since the early years of the UCC.
The shape of Revised Article 9 also may reflect a legal culture
that is very different from that prevailing decades ago, when the
original version of Article 9 was being formed. It is ironic that at a
time when "legal" writing is (slowly, but surely) becoming more
"plain" and "simple," the trend in commercial-law codification
appears to favor more detail, more forks in the road, less elegance,
and "answers" for ever more hypothetical cases. Ironically, this
crusade for comprehensiveness and certainty may be fueled in part by
rising expectations that result from the high quality of the UCC.176 A
lawyer who seeks guidance on a new issue approaches the common
law with trepidation. Perhaps a case exactly on point already has been
decided by the highest court in the relevant jurisdiction; if not (and,
sometimes, even if so), all bets are off. In contrast, Article 9 has given
clear answers to such a wide range of problems arising in secured
transactions that users approach it with the expectation that it will
answer whatever new question may have just arisen. They are not
only disappointed but also surprised when the Article fails them.
Another likely contributor to the pressure for increased certainty
of result, and thus increased complexity of the statute, is the practice
of requiring the debtor's attorney to issue a written opinion on
attachment, perfection, and other secured-transactions-related issues
as a condition to the extension of credit. Particularly in the case of
publicly issued, secured debt, the ability of the debtor's counsel to
issue a "clean opinion" can make the difference between a
transaction that closes and one that does not. Accordingly, the
Drafting Committee often was inclined to address in the revised
Article what some pooh-poohed as "opinion-letter issues."
Finally, the impact of reported decisions on the desire for
certainty should not be overlooked. As was the case with the revision
of Article 6, the fear that judges will "get it wrong" loomed large at
the Article 9 Drafting Committee meetings.177 Although they do not
176. As the Seventh Circuit observed, "The Uniform Commercial Code is an uncommonly
well drafted statute." Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Devon Bank, 832 F.2d 1005,
1008 (7th Cir. 1987).
177. See Steven L. Harris, Article 6: The Processand the Product- An Introduction,41 ALA.
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hold a monopoly on rendering incorrect decisions under Article 9,178
bankruptcy judges posed a particular concern. Bankruptcy is the
"acid test" of the durability of a security interest; a security interest
that is unenforceable on the day of reckoning will have failed in one
of its essential purposes. It is unsurprising that much-probably
most-Article-9-related litigation takes place in the bankruptcy
courts. What is surprising, however, is that this litigation gives rise to
a large number of published judicial opinions. In fairness to the
bankruptcy courts, we sense that often they have not had much help
from counsel on either side of cases resulting in bad decisions. And in
fairness to the courts and counsel, we further suspect that in many of
these cases the stakes simply were not sufficient to warrant thorough
analysis and briefing. Bankruptcy courts have no choice whether to
decide cases implicating Article 9; however, they need not make the
opinions part of the permanent jurisprudence.
B. Dichotomies,Fuzzy Lines, Rough Justice,and Punting to the
Courts
It would be a mistake to conclude from the foregoing that
Revised Article 9 has adopted a complex and detailed approach to
every aspect of secured transactions. In some areas, the revised
Article eschews complex rules that attempt to dictate the results
under myriad factual settings and instead provides a clear, unadorned
path for reaching a desired result (e.g., perfection of a security
interest). Parties who stray from the path do so at their peril.
Consider, for example, the revised Article's treatment of
perfection of security interests in collateral that is in the possession of
a person other than the debtor or the secured party. Under Former
section 9-305, perfection could be achieved by the bailee's receipt of
"notification of the secured party's interest." Under Revised section
9-313, however, perfection occurs when "the person in possession
authenticates a record acknowledging that it holds possession of the

L. REV. 549, 580 (1990).
178. See, e.g., Octagon Gas Sys., Inc. v. Rimmer, 995 F.2d 948 (10th Cir. 1993). In Octagon
Gas, the court "erroneously stated that '[t]he impact of applying Article 9 to [the buyer's]
account is that Article 9's treatment of accounts sold as collateral would place [the buyer's]
account within the property of [the seller's] bankruptcy estate."' PEB COMMENTARY NO. 14,
TRANSFER OF ACCOUNTS OR CHATTEL PAPER (1994) (quoting Octagon Gas, 995 F.2d at 955).
Revised section 9-318 rejects Octagon Gas insofar as the opinion interpreted Article 9. See also
Harris, supra note 118 (discussing two Second Circuit opinions that reflect misunderstanding of
a fundamental principle underlying Article 9).
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collateral for the secured party's benefit." 17 9 The path to perfection is
clearly marked and concisely articulated, i.e., obtain a signed writing
or other authenticated record that recites the acknowledgement
specified in the statute. Short of that, the contents of other
authenticated records that might satisfy the statutory requirement are
left to our imagination (and that of the courts). A secured party that
chooses to rely on an acknowledgement that strays from the precise
statutory formulation acts at its own risk.
Of the many examples of rules and concepts in Revised Article 9
which are painted with a broad brush, leaving the details to be
developed by the courts, three will suffice for present purposes.
Revised Article 9 continues the dichotomy between security interests
arising out of sales and those in which the security interest secures an
obligation. Although each type of security interest is treated the same
for most purposes, some differences exist. For example, a security
interest arising out of a sale of a payment intangible is automatically
perfected, whereas filing is necessary to perfect a security interest in a
payment intangible which secures an obligation. 810 As with all such
dichotomies, some transactions lie close to the borderline, and parties
who engage in these transactions would be prudent to take the
precaution of making alternative assumptions. Revised Article 9 also
retains the vague but hard-to-improve-upon "commercially
reasonable" standard as the lynchpin of a secured party's remedies on
default. 1 '
Revised Article 9 likewise reflects considerable restraint in
dealing with the enforcement of subordinate security interests. The
goal of the revised Article in this context is to encourage parties
holding conflicting security interests to find out about one another
and act cooperatively before a disposition occurs. To achieve this
goal, Revised Article 9 needs very few provisions, the most significant
of which requires an enforcing secured party to give notice of an
intended disposition to other secured parties (including senior
secured parties) that have filed against the debtor with respect to the
collateral involved1 82 Many questions that were open under Article 9
remain open under the revised Article. 83
179. R. § 9-313(c)(1); see also supra text accompanying notes 40-41.
180. See R. §§ 9-309(3), 9-310.
181. See, e.g., id. § 9-610(b) (disposition of collateral following default must be commercially
reasonable).
182. See id. § 9-611.
183. The revised Article does answer some questions on this subject, however. See, e.g., id.
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On the other hand, in some areas experience may demonstrate
that the approach of Revised Article 9 is too timid. Particularly
lamentable in this respect is the treatment-or the lack thereof-of
certain aspects of consumer transactions. For example, for
nonconsumer transactions Revised section 9-626 adopts the
"rebuttable presumption" rule for a secured party's noncompliance
with the Article. Until late in the drafting process, drafts of the
revised Article included an alternative "absolute bar" rule, thereby
inviting each enacting state to choose the approach that it deemed
most appropriate for consumer transactions. That approach would
have cleared up a good deal of confusion and uncertainty under the
Former Article. Unfortunately, as a part of a compromise, the
rebuttable presumption rule codified in Revised section 9-626(a)
explicitly applies only to transactions other than consumer
transactions. Revised section 9-626(b) represents a damage-control
effort; it provides:
(b) [Non-consumer transactions; no inference.] The limitation of
the rules in subsection (a) to transactions other than consumer
transactions is intended to leave to the court the determination of
the proper rules in consumer transactions. The court may not infer
from that limitation the nature of the proper rule in consumer
transactions and may continue to apply established approaches.
Whether subsection (b) will yield in practice its apparently
intended consequences remains to be seen. We fear that it will induce
counsel to litigate anew the proper rule in consumer transactions,
even when the applicable rule was settled under the applicable
jurisdiction's Former Article 9.
CONCLUSION

Revised Article 9 emerged from the lengthiest and most publicly
vetted uniform law project to date. Preparatory work for the Study
Committee began in the fall of 1989. Now, in June 1999, we continue
to stumble across stylistic and other minor errors as well as a few that
are more substantive. No one can expect such a large and complex
statutory treatment to be "perfect" and free of error. This is
especially so when one considers that the heavy lifting on the project
was undertaken by volunteer labor. 114 It is to this volunteer labor that
the project owes its success. The Drafting Committee was dedicated

§ 9-615(g) (junior secured party's right to retain cash proceeds of disposition).
184. As reporters, we did receive a modest stipend, however.
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and hard working. Its chair, William M. Burke, guided the Drafting
Committee firmly, but gently, through hundreds of hours of
deliberations on difficult and sometimes controversial issues. Credit
also goes to the hundreds of persons who contributed in other waysas formal advisors to the Drafting Committee, as members of the
Law
as Uniform
Group,
Consultative
Members
ALI's
Commissioners, through bar committees, through interest groups,
through trade associations, and as individuals concerned about
improving commercial law.
Looking back on the drafting process, we are reminded
constantly that Revised Article 9 was not written upon a blank slate.
The revised Article is a direct outgrowth of its predecessor, a statute
thought by many to be the "crown jewel" of the Uniform Commercial
Code. Upon completion of the PEB Study Committee Report, we
were surprised to have discovered so many flaws and shortcomings in
Former Article 9. More than six years later, however, having
completed the drafting of a wholesale revision of the Former Article,
we are humbled by the process and the challenge. It is now even
clearer to us how outstanding was the work of the original drafters
and those who drafted the 1972 revisions. We owe a great debt to
those drafters, including, among others, Grant Gilmore, Robert
Braucher, Peter Coogan, Robert Haydock, and Homer Kripke. We
cannot reflect on our involvement with the revision of Article 9
without also reflecting on theirs. And, in looking forward to July 1,
2001, and beyond, we dare to hope that the statute to which we have
dedicated such a substantial part of our professional lives will live up
to the high standards they set.
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